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 The current literature on economic reform is fragmented and lacks a cohesive theoretical 
framework to fully explain the politics of neoliberal reform adoption. The multiple perspectives 
presented in the literature, including institutional, pluralist, macroeconomic, international 
pressures, and policy networks, create an incoherent explanation of economic liberalization.  In 
an effort to more completely account for the political dynamics of the economic reform process, 
my analysis incorporates the primary variables supported by the literature on market-oriented 
reform within an informal institutions framework.  My primary variable of interest is policy 
networks, and I support this with the theory of informal institutions while considering the 
political and economic context surrounding the reform process.  The model I provide integrates 
the competing approaches to the study of reform.  Unlike past studies, my study offers a 
comprehensive analysis of the politics of economic reform.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The latter part of the twentieth century marked a dramatic shift in the economic policies 
of Latin American nations.  Decades of poor economic choices, primarily the strategy of import-
substituting industrialization, compounded by the 1982 debt crisis, compelled many governments 
to move toward market-oriented policies.  Economic reforms swept the region, enforcing policies 
that opened the national economy to foreign competition and reduced the role of the state in 
directing the allocation of resources and production in the economy.  Although the nations of this 
region suffered similar economic hardships and maintained relative dependency on international 
lenders, the degree of implementation of neoliberal reforms varied from state to state.  Some 
governments, specifically Chile and Mexico, chose to liberalize their economies rapidly, while 
others, like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, sought a gradual shift to market 
opening (Edwards 1995).  Nonetheless, all these governments pursued economic reform 
according to the emerging consensus that prescribed reduction of fiscal deficits, deregulation, 
privatization, and trade liberalization. 
The adoption of economic policies in accordance to the so-called Washington Consensus 
ushered in an era of market liberalization in Latin America.1  Although the specifics of the 
reform programs differed in each country, there were two common elements.  First, there was a 
need to establish macroeconomic stability by reducing fiscal deficits (Singh, et al. 2005).  Many 
reforms were initiated to curb the inflationary financing of government deficits.  Policies to keep 
government spending in line with tax revenue were implemented.  The second basic component 
of the emerging economic consensus focused on opening the external sector to foreign 
competition (Edwards 1995).  Increasing the role of market forces through privatization and 
                                                 
1 The reform policies included tax reform, market-determined interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade 
liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment, privatization, and deregulation (Williamson 1990).  
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deregulation became crucial to economic openness.  Such measures removed currency 
restrictions and liberalized trade and capital flows, including foreign direct investment.  
Additionally, the role of the state in the domestic economy was drastically reduced by the sale of 
state-owned-enterprises.  These reform programs consistent with the Washington Consensus 
sought to stabilize the domestic economy, open the market, and attract foreign investment.  
While there was an existing consensus on the economics of reform, there was not—and is not 
presently—a consensus on the politics of economic liberalization.   
The politics of market reform must be understood in the context of difficult economic 
transitions.  Opening the market generates high—and painful—transitional costs to society: 
unemployment, price increases, and production declines (Hellman 1998).  These short term costs 
must be endured while the economy makes the necessary adjustments to become a long-term 
effective and efficient market economy (Przeworski 1991).2  Liberalization concentrates present 
costs on those that benefited from the closed economy—laborers, small firms, and others that 
received subsidies or privileged positions—while the future benefits of neoliberal policies, such 
as low inflation, are public goods that are dispersed more widely.  The divide among the losers 
(those favoring the status quo) and the winners (those benefiting now or in the future from 
market reform) characterizes the political environment surrounding neoliberal policy formation 
and implementation.  There is abundant literature that seeks to specify the political dynamics of 
economic liberalization.   
Five central approaches to the analysis of the politics inherent to economic reform may 
be identified: institutional, pluralist, macroeconomic, international, and policy networks.  
Broadly, institutional scholars focus on the institutional arrangements that insulate the state from 
                                                 
2 This transition period is informally known as the J-curve.  Przeworski (1991) asserts that the “valley of transition” 
must be traversed in order to reach the “higher hills” of a reformed and efficient economy. 
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opposition (the losers) and empower policy-makers to pass market reform legislation (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1992 and 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Biglaiser and Brown 2003 and 
forthcoming).  Pluralist studies focus on the societal groups, both winners and losers, and how 
these interests organize and interact with the government during the reform process (Frieden 
1991; Nelson 1992; Schamis 1999; Murillo 2003).  Another vein of research concentrates on the 
macroeconomy and its influence on the behavior and choices of government leaders and society 
(Weyland 1998; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004).  Alternative studies direct attention to the 
international pressures for reform and the global community encouraging the opening of markets 
(Stallings 1992; Kahler 1992).  Furthermore, policy networks scholars underscore the importance 
of the technocratic teams propelling reform programs and their integration of the business groups 
benefiting from neoliberal policies (Teichman 2001; Waterbury 1992). 
Institutional studies focus on the structures that affect market reform.  Specifically, this 
research focuses on the insulation of the state and executive during the reform process.  Early 
studies focused on regime type, contending that authoritarian regimes are more insulated than 
democracies, and therefore, more capable of implementing painful economic policies.3  Unlike 
authoritarian regimes, democracies empower citizens, and protests against unpopular policies 
may block reform in a democratic regime.  Despite the supposed relationship between 
authoritarian regimes and neoliberal reform, many studies have demonstrated authoritarianism is 
no longer viewed as a critical prerequisite for the adoption of market-oriented policies (Remmer 
1986 and 1998).  After all, market-oriented policies have been successfully pursued by a variety 
of different regimes—military, one-party, democratic (Remmer 1998).  Scholars now look to 
sub-regime features.  This “unpacking” of the regime entails the analysis of executive strength, 
                                                 
3 Chile under Pinochet’s rule provides a prime example of the ability of authoritarian regimes to pursue market-
oriented reform in opposition of broad sectors of society (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Weyland 1998).   
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legislative-executive relationships, electoral systems, and party structures (Biglaiser and Brown 
2003).  Many contend that strong executives possessing great constitutional powers are 
effectively insulated from societal pressures (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring and 
Shugart 1997).  Therefore, reform is more easily implemented.  Moreover, research shows if the 
legislative-executive relationship is one of unified government, the executive is further shielded 
from opposition.  This permits the executive to pursue neoliberal reform more freely than if 
interacting with a legislature controlled by the opposition party (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; 
Biglaiser and Brown forthcoming).   These institutional arrangements, among others, shape the 
course of reform.  Although institutional studies are useful in identifying the structures that 
facilitate or hinder reform, they fail to account for social actors in the analysis of reform politics. 
Unlike institutional analyses, pluralist research concentrates on the social interests, 
particularly business and labor, affecting the formation and implementation of economic policy 
(Frieden 1991).  In theory, business groups support neoliberal policies.  The opening of the 
economy provides private businesses with new opportunities of expansion and growth (Schamis 
1999).  On the other hand, labor groups oppose market-oriented reforms due to the costs of 
opening of the market (Murillo 2003; Nelson 1992).  The removal of protectionist policies and 
state intervention makes the labor sector vulnerable, often leading to increases in unemployment 
and decreases in wages.  While the pluralist approach demonstrates the importance of business 
and labor interests, it tends to overemphasize the magnitude of these groups’ influence.  
Moreover, this perspective lacks explanatory power by solely considering the politics of interests 
during the reform process.  For example, the economic conditions tempering the behavior of 
business and labor groups are neglected.  The economic environment is addressed by 
macroeconomic studies. 
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The macroeconomic approach asserts that macroeconomic indicators, such as economic 
crisis, inflation, and growth, explain the adoption of neoliberal policies.  The initiation of reform 
may be spurred by economic crisis and high inflation.  These conditions create such high costs to 
society in the present that reform measures become desirable.  Individuals in failing economies 
are compelled to choose market reform, despite the painful transition that accompanies 
liberalization (Weyland 1998; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004).   Moreover, the implementation of 
market reform is linked to economic growth.  Poor economies are not able to offset the costs of 
liberalization to its citizens.  Therefore, market reform is more likely with wealthier nations that 
can “afford” the transition to an open economy (Jensen 2003). 4  This approach emphasizes the 
importance of economic conditions in the adoption of market reform.  Also, studies espousing 
this perspective show that the economy affects individual behavior in relation to market opening.  
However, this vein of research neglects the role of the state and international community.  While 
macroeconomic studies overlook international pressures, other scholars focus on this component. 
Many scholars have directed attention to the manner in which international influences 
affect the adoption of market-oriented reforms.  They argue that the international community 
exerts great pressure on governments to liberalize their economies (Stallings 1992; Kahler 1992).  
It is often the case that the initiation of neoliberal reforms is necessary to obtain capital and 
resources from international lending agencies.  Therefore, research has shown an empirical 
relationship between international financial assistance and the initiation of market reform 
(Remmer 1998; Smith, Young, and Li 2006; Biglaiser and Brown forthcoming).  These studies 
demonstrate that international pressures are crucial for the adoption of market-oriented policies.  
                                                 
4 Jensen discusses this, stating “in countries with large spans of the population hovering just above poverty, 
economic reform has not been fully implemented. This result is consistent with an explanation similar to 
Przeworski’s J curve. Only the states where the majority of the population could sustain the initial drop in income 
without falling into poverty enacted and continued economic reform” (Jensen 2003: 1108). 
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Yet, this approach overemphasizes the role of international agencies and fails to incorporate the 
domestic actors involved in the reform process.  The examination of actors is necessary for a 
complete analysis of the politics of neoliberal reform, and policy networks studies call attention 
to this element. 
Policy network studies redirect the focus of neoliberal reform analysis to the actors from 
whom policy originates (Haggard 1990).  This approach assumes the reform process to be a 
highly concentrated activity, resting in the hands of a policy network (Teichman 2001) or change 
team (Waterbury 1992)—a small group of policy elite—and incorporating domestic and 
international actors (Kenis and Raab 2003).  To date, policy network studies have been 
qualitative in nature and relied on case studies to highlight the role of these teams in the reform 
process.  Teichman’s (2001) analysis demonstrates market reform in Chile, Argentina, and 
Mexico was dominated by policy networks.  Additionally, Waterbury’s (1992) research of 
Mexico offered evidence that coherent change teams facilitate privatization.  Even though these 
studies give prominence to the politics driving reform, the findings are limited to the cases 
studied.  The policy networks approach lacks a quantitative measure of these groups, thereby 
limiting the general applicability of this approach.  Furthermore, this literature miscalculates the 
power of policy networks by overlooking the role of the executive in appointing technocrats.  
The current literature on economic reform is fragmented and lacks a cohesive theoretical 
framework to fully explain the politics of neoliberal reform adoption. The multiple perspectives 
presented in the literature create an incoherent explanation of economic liberalization.  Pluralist 
and macroeconomic studies neglect state structure (Haggard 1990; Biglaiser and DeRouen 
2004); on the other hand, institutionalist literature overemphasizes the role of the state (Haggard 
1990; Silva 1993).  Moreover, research focused on international influences overlooks the 
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domestic societal actors affecting reform (Remmer 2002), but policy networks studies 
overemphasize the power of technocrats (Weyland 2003).   
While the competing approaches may produce inconsistencies within the literature, the 
lack of cohesion may be due to the methods utilized to study this political phenemonon.  
Qualitative literature tends to exaggerate the role of politics (Teichman 2001) while quantitative 
studies underplay the influence of political entities (Biglaiser and Brown 2003 and forthcoming).  
This disconnect between country-specific studies and cross-sectional research may add to the 
incoherent nature of the literature as a whole.  Then again, the fragmented state of the literature 
on economic reform may simply be contributed to the complexity of the political pheneomena 
studied.  Afterall, the analysis of the transition to neoliberal policies entails the consideration of 
multiple political actors, institutions, and conditions.  Nonetheless, the literature on market 
reform fails to provide a unified explanation of the politics of economic liberalization.  
In an effort to more completely account for the political dynamics of the economic 
reform process, my analysis incorporates the primary variables supported by the literature on 
neoliberal reform within an informal institutions framework (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).  My 
primary variable of interest is policy networks, and I support this with the theory of informal 
institutions while considering the political and economic context surrounding the reform process.  
I argue that policy networks explain the politics of market reform in their capacity as informal 
institutions.  Due to their highly exclusionary, personalistic, and unofficial nature, policy 
networks may be considered a type of informal institution.  These informal networks may be 
classified as substitutive informal institutions because they serve as surrogates to weak formal 
structures during the reform process.  Ineffective state institutions are replaced with the informal 
institutions of policy networks during the formation and implementation of neoliberal policies.  
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Furthermore, I contend that formal institutions, societal interests, and international and economic 
pressures mediate the impact of policy networks on the reform process.   
State institutions, labor groups and the business sector, the international community, and 
economic pressures affect the role that policy networks play in the reform process.  The 
influence of policy networks is tempered by the bounds of formal institutions, primarily the 
strength of the executive and the composition of the legislature.  These structures determine 
whether a policy network is empowered or prevented from propelling the reform process.  
Additionally, societal groups, particularly business, and the international community have 
bearing on the reform agenda of policy networks.  Finally, economic pressures affect the 
environment in which policy networks operate.  For example, high inflation may hinder the 
ability of policy networks to successfully pursue the sale of state-owned enterprises.  Due to their 
mediating effect on policy networks and their impact on reform in general, the inclusion of 
institutions, social groups, international and economic pressures is necessary.   
My analysis provides a model that integrates the competing approaches to the study of 
reform.  Furthermore, this framework addresses the shortcomings of the policy networks 
literature by placing a quantitative measure of policy networks in a model that accounts for the 
executive’s strength and will.  Unlike past studies, my study offers a comprehensive analysis of 
the politics of economic reform.   
In the first section, the literature on economic reform is reviewed in detail.  Then, the 
theoretical framework of informal institutions is described and incorporated into the discussion 
of policy networks.  The third section outlines the research design, including variables, methods, 
and model.  Section four presents the results and discussion of the findings.  In the final section, I 
present the conclusions of my findings and suggest areas for future research. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are five main approaches to the study of the politics of economic reform: 
institutional, pluralist, macroeconomic, international, and policy networks.  Institutional studies 
emphasize the political institutional arrangements of the state, legislature, executive, party 
structure, and electoral cycle.  Pluralist analyses focus on the interests that shape economic 
policy, whereas macroeconomic studies underscore the economic conditions prompting and 
effecting reform.  Explanations for reform supporting an international perspective highlight the 
influence of external forces, particularly international financial institutions, on reform adoption.  
Finally, policy networks studies call attention to the technocratic teams from whom policy 
originates as crucial actors in the reform process.  Each approach answers the question—what 
are the politics of neoliberal reform?—in a different manner; moreover, I argue each provides 
only a partial explanation.  Table 1 provides a summary of the primary components and the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES  
Recent studies espousing an institutional approach to the analysis of neoliberal reform 
focus on the insulation of the state and emphasize features of executive strength, legislative-
executive relationships, electoral systems, party structures, and electoral calendar.  Of these sub-
regime factors, I first discuss the literature on executive strength.  Second, the variable of 
executive-legislative relations is considered.  Then, the arguments regarding party fragmentation, 
polarization, and the electoral calendar are detailed.  Finally, the weaknesses and shortcomings 
of this approach are examined. 
The strength of the executive is a primary feature of institutional studies.  Executive 
strength signifies a highly empowered and insulated president, and it is commonly  
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Table 1: Summary of Approaches to the Analysis of Neoliberal Reform in Latin America 
 Main Tenet Primary Features Strength Weakness 
Institutional Insulation of the state 
is necessary for 
initiation of neoliberal 
reform. 
• Regime 
• Executive strength 









the reform process. 
Neglects treatment of 
the societal forces 
that influence reform. 
Pluralist Formulation of reform 
policy is impacted by 
social actors/groups. 
• Business interests 
• Union/labor strength 
Shows labor may 





ability of groups to 
organize and lacks 
explanatory power.  
Macroeconomic Economic conditions 




• GDP per capita 
• Current account 
balance 
• External debt 
Explains how the 









policy options as well 





pressure the adoption 
of market-oriented 
policies. 
• External aid 
 
Illustrates the power 
of international 
financial institutions 






Policy Networks Policy networks are 
the principle driving 
force behind neoliberal 
reform. 
• Policy network—
finance minister and 
business sector 
Underscores the 
role of technocratic 
teams in forming 
and transferring 
economic policy.  
Lacks an appropriate 
measure and fails to 
account for the 




operationalized as the constitutional powers the president possesses.  For example, decree power, 
veto power, and the power to introduce legislation characterize the executive position as one 
with great strength.  Haggard and Kaufman (1995) claim a centralized executive is needed for 
successful initiation of liberalization.  In the same vein, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) argue a 
“strong” executive, with or without legislative backing, may successfully force the passage of 
economic reform legislation.  Although strong executives may achieve reform without legislative 
support, the relationship between the president and legislature is an crucial element of 
institutional analyses. 
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Principally, the alignment of political parties between the executive and legislature has 
been included in institutional analyses.  Divided government—a lack of a legislative majority 
comprised of the executive party—hinders market-oriented reform (Mainwaring and Shugart 
1997).  On the other hand, when the executive party controls the legislature, the passage of 
reform legislation does not face impediment by opposition parties.  Beyond the relationship of 
the executive and legislature, institutional studies further examine the legislature via electoral 
and party system characteristics.   
Fragmentation of the party system as a result of electoral rules takes primary focus.  
Haggard and Kaufman define fragmented party systems as “ones in which social cleavages, 
ideological divisions, and/or electoral rules (particularly proportional representation) result in a 
proliferation of parties” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 279).  A fragmented party system is 
characterized by a large number of political parties, all representing a variety of opposing 
preferences.  Such a system splits the legislature and makes agreement on policy contingent upon 
coalitions among several parties, which is often problematic (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).  In 
addition to the fragmentation of party system, polarization of the party structure is an important 
consideration of institutional studies.  Polarization signifies the ideological distance between 
parties in the legislature, implying that a large distance hampers reform (Haggard and Kaufman 
1995; Mainwaring 1999).  In addition to the characteristic of fragmentation and polarization as 
features of the electoral system, institutional studies examine the electoral calendar as influential 
to the initiation of neoliberal reform.   
Conventional wisdom posits reform is more easily implemented in the first years 
following an election (Franzese, Jr. 2002; Remmer 1993; Persson 2002).  The “honeymoon” 
period after an election permits the executive to place blame for any painful adjustments and 
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policies on the previous leadership.  Moreover, opposition to reform is low following an election 
because anti-market groups have had little time to organize.  In contrast to this argument, some 
research has shown a “reverse honeymoon” effect has a greater impact on privatization.  
Biglaiser and Brown (2003) in their study of state divestiture determine “reverse honeymoon”—
the years since the last election—is significantly related to the process of divestiture.  They 
contend that market reform is a complex process requiring much time to coordinate and 
implement, therefore, privatization occurs in the latter years of a presidential term (Biglaiser and 
Brown 2003).  Regardless of its operationalization—“honeymoon” or “reverse honeymoon”—it 
is evident that the electoral calendar influences the neoliberal reform.  
Current institutional studies on market reform have been undertaken by Biglaiser and 
Brown (2003 and forthcoming).  Their analyses of neoliberal reform and privatization consider 
the following institutional variables: regime type, divided government, polarization, 
fragmentation, honeymoon, executive strength, and executive ideology.  In their examination of 
economic liberalization, they find no strong correlation between these institutional variables and 
reform.  On this point, Biglaiser and Brown state, “Once important economic constraints have 
been accounted for, it appears there is no single institution or ideological preference that 
precludes countries from adopting structural reforms” (Biglaiser and Brown forthcoming: 19).  
Unlike the findings of Biglaiser and Brown’s studies, Neilson’s (2003) analysis of trade 
reform demonstrates the significance of institutions.  This quantitative analysis examines the 
impact of executive powers, electoral system components, and legislature composition, while 
controlling for several economic factors.  Neilson finds that presidential power is a consistent 
predictor of trade reform.  His conclusions call for more research on the relationship between 
institutions and economic reform. 
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Approaches focusing on sub-regime features expose the institutional arrangements that 
may facilitate or hinder neoliberal reform.  Although institutional studies offer insight into the 
influence of structures, they fail to address the actors involved in the reform process (Haggard 
1990).  Silva notes, “For all its utility, state structure cannot explain the content of policy. The 
problem is that the state structure approach, by its very nature, undervalues the fact that policy 
requires carriers” (Silva 1993: 529).  Consequently, institutional approaches neglect the 
interaction of social actors and their power over market-oriented reform.  
PLURALIST APPROACHES 
Pluralist approaches focus on the interaction between societal groups and the government 
in the formation of economic policy.  This perspective focuses on the preferences, resources, and 
strategies of groups in their attempt to influence market-oriented policies to their benefit (Frieden 
1991).  The literature discusses the organization of two groups during the reform process: 
businesss and labor.   
The business sector and labor groups have great incentives to mobilize in response to 
reform.  It is widely argued that the private business sector supports neoliberal policies due to 
benefits garnered from market opening (Schamis 1999).  However, market reform creates great 
costs for labor groups in society, including unemployment and decreases in wages.  These 
transitional costs are greatly felt by labor because this sector enjoyed protection before 
liberalization.  While labor is able to effectively organize in opposition to reform due to its 
existing union infrastructure, general members of the society that benefit from market reform 
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remain unorganized and dispersed (Murillo 2003).5  Thus, the two groups that emerge in favor of 
and in opposition of neoliberal reform are business and labor, respectively. 
Some pluralist studies contend business interests are the strongest societal force 
supporting market reform.  Remmer writes, “The single most powerful source of domestic 
support for market-oriented reforms…may be expected to come from exporting interests…” 
(Remmer 1998: 10).  Remmer bears this out empirically by linking exports as a ratio to GDP to 
greater prospects for reform.  Similarly, Silva (1993) illustrates in his case study of Chile that 
capitalist and landowning coalitions helped shape policy in each stage of reform.  Frieden (1991) 
also relates the manufacturing and agribusiness sectors to changes in economic policy in Brazil, 
Mexico, and Venezuela after the debt crisis.  Likewise, Corrales (1998) explains fluctuations in 
privatization policy via the challenges and negotiations of the business sector. Certainly, this 
research has shown business interests are influential to neoliberal reform. 
Similarly, pluralist studies have found labor groups affect macroeconomic reforms.  
Murillo’s analysis of reform in Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela demonstrates labor unions 
effectively influence the course and pace of market reform (Murillo 2003).  Labor unions are in a 
position to bargain with government leaders on the extent of liberalization and, in the cases 
Murillo studied, often changed the timing and depth of the reforms implemented.6  However, 
there are very few instances in which labor unions actually derail market reform.  Although, 
“labor combined with other elements of the urban popular sectors has done so in some instances” 
                                                 
5 Recall that the benefits of reform take on the character of public goods.  And these goods have not been realized by 
general society.  So, the identity of “winner” remains uncertain and provides little incentives to mobilize support for 
reform. For a full discussion, see Murillo 2003. 
6 Murillo notes, “Even if labor unions did not derail the reform process, they contributed to its obstruction or 
success, and pace or shape in the three countries studied The quiescence of Argentine and Mexican unions 
facilitated the tasks of Menem and Salinas respectively, although unions were more successful in exercising policy 
input in the former country than in the latter. In Venezuela, labor unrest not only derailed Pérez’s social and labor 
policies, but it also contributed to the demise of his reforms” (Murillo 2003: 200).  
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(Nelson 1992: 245).  Thus, the literature on labor unions concedes that these groups influence 
reform but do not yield the power to completely derail liberalization measures.  
Pluralist studies demonstrate that neoliberal reform is shaped by interaction between 
government leaders and business and labor sectors (Remmer 2002).  However, in examining the 
interaction of domestic actors and the pressure produced by societal groups, these studies 
overemphasize the capability of groups to organize and express interests (Stallings 1992).  
Additionally, the pluralist approach neglects treatment of the state.  Geddes (1994) points out 
that pluralist studies envision the state as a pool of resources that can be utilized by the best-
organized groups when full, but useless when empty.  Moreover, analyses of this kind have weak 
explanatory power.  Haggard writes, “The strength of different social groups—agriculture 
interests, labor, and business—can constrain or widen the feasible set of policy reforms, but it is 
difficult to explain policy outcomes by reference to coalition interests alone, particularly where 
social groups are poorly organized, interest are subject to uncertainty, and states are ‘strong’” 
(Haggard 1990: 28).  Pluralist studies may direct analysis to important interests influencing 
market-oriented policies; however, the study of interests alone does not sufficiently account for 
neoliberal reform.  
MACROECONOMIC APPROACHES 
Macroeconomic studies focus on the macroeconomic variables, including economic 
crisis, inflation, and growth, that influence the initiation of market reform.  These factors are 
important to understanding the reform process because they affect the choice to pursue or deepen 
economic reform.  Economic crisis and high inflation compels governments to open the 
economy.  The painful transition to a reformed market economy is acceptable when the economy 
is in a crisis.  However, economic reform cannot be successfully initiated and sustained by poor 
 16
economies.  Countries experiencing low income and growth levels cannot bear the transitional 
costs associated with reform.  Such a transition would plummet their society into deeper poverty 
(Jensen 2003).  For these reasons, the study of reform from a macroeconomic perspective entails 
the examination of economic crisis, inflation, and growth. 
Many studies have examined the impact of economic crisis on the reform process.  It is 
argued that crisis affects the behavior of the masses and the state leadership, forcing responses 
that would not surface otherwise (Rodrik 1994; Roberts and Wibbels 2000).  The severe 
economic consequences of crisis on the populace push executives to make changes in economic 
policy.  However, for the purposes of analysis, crisis explanations have difficulty in accounting 
for the timing, scope, and content of reform.  Williamson and Haggard maintain, “Crisis is 
clearly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to the initiation of reform” (Williamson and 
Haggard 1994: 589).  Moreover, there is a logical problem in relying on crisis as a determinant 
of reform.  As Rodrik (1996) notes, crisis studies are founded on ex post reasoning, arguing that 
if a crisis did not lead to reform, it was not severe enough to spur changes.  However, contrary to 
Rodrik, many scholars analyze how crisis affects the politics of reform.  
High inflation—which is often utilized as a proxy for crisis—has been linked to the 
initiation of neoliberal reform.  Remmer (1998) finds high inflation significantly increases the 
chances that governments will initiate orthodox programs.  Similarly, Weyland (1998) 
establishes that hyperinflation induces reform.  Weyland introduces the prospect theory to 
explain how inflation prompts executives to pursue—and society to support—market reform.  
The prospect theory argues that individuals make choices based on the perception of gains and 
losses.  In other words, attitudes and decisions toward risk are dependent upon context.  When 
individuals perceive themselves to be in the “domain of losses”, they are more risk-acceptant.  
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Conversely, when they see themselves in the “domain of gains”, they are risk-averse.  Citizens in 
the domain of losses are more risk-seeking and willing to accept uncertain policies, such as 
market reforms.  Moreover, Weyland contends that hyperinflation puts individuals in the domain 
of losses, thereby encouraging policymakers to implement reform and society to support 
liberalization measures.  Subsequently, Biglaiser and DeRouen test Weyland’s propect theory 
assumptions and find: “skyrocketing inflation can cause paradigmatic shifts away from 
protectionism and toward market-oriented policies” by putting leaders and citizens in the domain 
of loss that pushes them to be risk-acceptant (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004: 574).  In addition to 
the prospect theory explanation, cost-benefit arguments establish high inflation garners popular 
support for reform by creating a large pool of winners that balances the policy losers from other 
aspects of reform (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004: 575).  Clearly, research demonstrates high 
inflation is a catalyst for reform. 
Beyond crisis and inflation, positive macroeconomic factors offer explanation for 
expanding market-oriented reforms.  All told, reforms in the short-term are costly (Przeworski 
1991).  However, in the long-run, a competitive and efficient market emerges, thus promoting 
economic prosperity.  Biglaiser and DeRouen contend, “the expectation is that countries 
benefiting from high economic growth, a positive current account balance, and low inflation are 
likely to deepen reforms” (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004: 565).  Studies utilizing macroeconomic 
factors to explain reform claim positive growth and low inflation are evidence of the success of 
previous reform and offer a supportive climate for further change.  
Focusing the analysis of market-oriented reform on macroeconomic factors underscores 
the importance of economic forces in the reform process.  The literature demonstrates high 
inflation encourages the adoption of reform.  Moreover, studies show that economic growth is 
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linked to the ability of governments to initiate liberalization as well as deepen reforms.  Although 
this literature highlights the economic conditions surrounding reform, its sole focus on the 
economy neglects the politics inherent to neoliberal reform.  This is important for two reasons.  
First of all, institutions are downplayed.  Biglaiser and DeRouen note, “…governments operating 
under high inflation are motivated to change policy course, with political institutions affecting 
what they can actually accomplish” (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004: 575).  Examination of 
institutions in conjunction with economic factors is warranted, as corroborated by Biglaiser and 
DeRouen’s study.  Secondly, political behavior and political actors are underestimated.  
Economic factors are significantly related to the adoption of reform because individuals and 
groups adjust their political action according to the economic situation.  The economy does not 
dictate reform; rather, individuals chose it.  It is important to include economic factors in the 
analysis of market-oriented reform in addition to consideration of the institutions and interests 
that influence neoliberal policy.  
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
 International pressures are a principal component in explaining the adoption of market-
oriented reforms in Latin America.  Neoliberalism was supported by the international 
community, and the reform measures necessary to open the economy became linked to aid 
packages.  Research regarding the influence of the international community looks at the policy 
convergence that prompted reform.  Also, scholars examine the bargaining game between 
international agencies and governments that continued throughout the reform process. 
Some scholars contend that the policy convergence during the 1980s compelled Latin 
American governments to adopt neoliberal reform measures in order to gain access to 
international resources.  Stallings (1992) argues that the move to privatization and liberalization 
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in Latin America is prima facie evidence that external forces were at work.  This was a period in 
which the economies of Latin American countries were failing and international influences were 
strong.  Stallings observes, “In the 1980s…international conditions—both political and 
economic—turned restrictive. The world economy slowed, finance dried up, and an international 
ideological and organizational consensus emerged around the use of market mechanisms as the 
proper approach to development. When this consensus was strong…Third World countries faced 
heavy pressure to go along in order to get access to resources” (Stallings 1992: 84-85).  
Governments chose to succumb to international pressures supporting neoliberal reform in order 
to gain resources.  To further examine this relationship between the acceptance of international 
aid and the adoption of market reform, Kahler frames this as a bargaining game.  
Kahler (1992) offers another dimension to the international approach by assessing 
international influence as a bargaining game.  Kahler notes, “The bargaining model centers on 
the core exchange of financial support for policy change, rewarding compliance with continued 
finance in the next round, pushing slippage with suspension of that support” (Kahler 1992: 94).  
From this perspective, influence becomes a cycle sustained over time, in which the reputation of 
the international financial institution breeds cooperation of the state, thereby attracting resources 
and strengthening the national economy as well as the constituents’ commitment to reform.  
Kahler’s bargaining approach remedies the criticism often waged against international studies—
that institutions are neglected.7  Examining the interaction of international financial agencies and 
domestic actors incorporates the state into the analysis.  
Several scholars have tested the relationship between international pressures and market 
reform empirically (Remmer 1998; Smith, Young and Li 2006).  At the aggregate level, Remmer 
                                                 
7 Haggard elaborates on this criticism, stating, “states remain the central actors shaping the international political 
economy…External pressures, even the most powerfully constraining ones, are filtered through the prism of 
domestic political life” (Haggard 1990: 270).   
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(1998) finds that high levels of external financial support, accepted in the wake of economic 
crisis, encourage neoliberal reforms.  Specifically, Biglaiser and Brown (forthcoming) find a 
significant link between IMF standby agreements and privatization.  Similarly, Smith, Young, 
and Li (2006) demonstrate that participation in IMF programs is linked to capital account 
liberalization.   
Studies adopting an international approach to the analysis of neoliberal reform illustrate 
that the inclusion of external variables is necessary in order to capture the complete story of 
reform.  However, such analyses tend to underestimate the role of domestic actors in the reform 
process.  Even though Kahler’s argument integrates domestic political actors in the bargaining 
game of lending, domestic societal forces are neglected.  Remmer posits, “The overriding 
conception is that the process of economic policy reform in Latin America has proceeded 
through the subordination of domestic political preferences to international economic 
pressures…” (Remmer 2002: 32).  International influences are significant, but their importance is 
arbitrated by domestic politics and actors.  External forces embodied by loans from international 
financial institutions should be part of a thorough study of neoliberal reform; however they do 
not constitute a complete analysis independently.  
POLICY NETWORKS 
The policy networks approach examines the technocratic teams responsible for the 
formation and implementation of economic reform.  Broadly, policy networks may be defined as 
“a set of actors who are linked by relatively stable relationships of a non-hierarchical and 
interdependent nature” (Kenis and Raab 2003: 11). These actors share common policy interests 
and exchange resources to achieve policy objectives.  Specifically in the context of market 
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reform, Teichman (2001) argues policy networks are hierarchical, tight, non-transparent groups 
comprised primarily of technocrats and members of the business community.   
Teichman’s analysis of market reform in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico demonstrates that 
although liberalization was a unique process in each country, the reform process in each was 
driven by policy networks.  During market reform policy networks are lead by technocrats, 
namely the finance minister.  Supporting this, Teichman states, “At the helm of the policy 
network is the technocratic policy clique (a tight team of three of four highly trained individuals, 
often economists, responsible for a policy area…usually the Finance Ministry or the central 
bank)…” (Teichman 2001: 18-19).  Although policy networks are commanded by the finance 
ministry, the business sector does play a major role in policy formation.  Teichman notes that 
policy networks have given business a privileged position that has enabled it to effectively shape 
economic policy.  Also, during the reform process policy networks work closely with members 
of the international community.  Teichman argues the interaction of international financial 
institutions with domestic policy elites was necessary in driving the reform process forward.8   
Policy network studies underscore the interplay of the technocratic teams responsible for 
policy ideas and the societal and international forces influencing those options.  On this 
Teichman notes, “As in no other period in Latin American history, policy ideas advocated by 
radical technocratic reformers came to play a central role in economic policy making, but the 
impact of powerful societal and intrastate interests continued to be felt and in tempering market 
reform ideas often determined the extent of market reform accomplishments” (Teichman 2001: 
198).  The policy network approach provides a framework for incorporating the technocratic 
                                                 
8 In the same vein, Stallings (1992) posits technocrats are the domestic link to the international community.  
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teams responsible for neoliberal reform into the analysis of economic policy formation.  
However, this approach is weak weakened by measurement and theoretical problems.   
First, it is difficult to measure and operationalize policy networks (Remmer 1998).  This 
has limited its application to purely qualitative studies, emphasizing case studies and 
generalizations on a small set of countries.9  Indeed, this limits the testing of policy networks 
against the institutional, pluralist, macroeconomic, and international approaches.  Second, policy 
networks overemphasize the role of technocratic teams in shaping reform, and therefore neglect 
the role of the executive.  Weyland writes, “Ultimately, experts are not the most decisive actors 
in neoliberal reform. In fact, they owe their very positions to the appointment decisions of 
political leaders. And while presidents do consider economic requirements and constraints, they 
pursue first and foremost political goals. The political decisions of presidents are absolutely 
crucial for the initiation of market reform; experts advise and recommend, but in the end, 
presidents decide” (Weyland 2003: 2).  For the policy networks approach to be incorporated into 
a thorough quantitative analysis, an appropriate measure of policy networks must be devised, and 






                                                 
9 It should be noted that technocrats, but not policy networks, have been included in quantitative studies.  Nielson’s 
(2003) examination of trade reform introduces “neoliberalism” as a control variable.  This variable is a proxy for the 
“ascension of neoliberal technocrats to positions of policymaking power” (Nielson 2003: 481).  It codes country 
years as a “1” beginning when neoliberal technocrats took power; “0” otherwise.  This variable becomes a 
significant predictor of reform in all his models.  Although this variable involves the measurement of technocrats, it 
is more aptly a proxy for neoliberal ideology than technocratic power.   
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THEORY 
To date the literature on economic liberalization has not provided a cohesive explanation 
of the politics of market reform.  Although existing studies have called attention to important 
components of the reform process—institutions, interests, macroeconomic conditions, 
international pressures, and policy networks—these analyses only provide partial accounts of the 
political environment surrounding the transition to an open market.  I contend that the integration 
of policy networks into the theoretical framework of informal institutions may give a more 
complete description of the politics of economic reform.  
Policy networks may be considered a type of informal institution, and it is in this capacity 
that their influence on the reform process is consequential.  Helmke and Levitsky  describe 
informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, 
and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727).  In 
contrast formal institutions are “rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and 
enforced through channels widely accepted as official” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727).  
Policy networks demonstrate the traits of the former rather than the latter.  First of all, the 
composition of policy networks evidences its informal character.  Policy networks bring together 
appointed government individuals—technocrats—with powerful members of the private sector.  
Moreover, as Teichman points out, “individuals may (and often do) constitute a policy network 
before they obtain formal positions in the state, and networks may even survive after 
governmental network participants have lost their official positions” (Teichman 2001: 17).  
Clearly, the individuals compromising market reform policy networks operate in a realm outside 
of officially sanctioned channels.  Second, policy networks share unwritten norms.  These groups 
are highly personalistic and exclusionary, “bound together by personal relationships, particularly 
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trust and loyalty, and [the] commit[ment] to market policy reform” (Teichman 2001: 17).  
Unwritten norms and behaviors dominate and bind together policy networks.  The unofficial 
character and processes that typify policy networks permits us to classify these organizations as 
informal institutions. 
Helmke and Levitsky create a typology of informal institutions that illustrates their 
political function (see Table 2).  They consider two dimensions: convergence with formal 
institutions and effectiveness of the relevant formal institutions.  When following informal rules 
produces similar results expected from formal institutions, the informal institution is considered 
convergent; on the other hand, when informal institutions lead to a substantively different 
outcome, formal and informal institutions diverge.  Additionally, effective formal institutions are 
those that actually constrain or enable political actors’ choices.  In this case actors believe 
noncompliance will be sanctioned.  Conversely, ineffective formal rules are those in which 
actors consider the probability of enforcement to be low.  This classification results in a fourfold 
typology of informal institutions:  
 
Table 2: Typology of Informal Institutions 
Outcomes Effective formal institutions Ineffective formal institutions 
Convergent  Complementary  Substitutive 
Divergent Accommodating Competing 
Source: Helmke and Levitsky (2004)
 
1.) Complementary—convergent and effective informal institutions.  These institutions 
produce a similar result expected from adherence to formal rules and actually 
constrain political actors’ behaviors.  They serve to strengthen the incentives to 
comply with formal institutions. 
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2.) Accommodating—divergent and effective informal institutions.  Such institutions 
generate incentives to act in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules.  
Therefore, accommodating institutions produce different outcomes than formal rules.  
Often these institutions are created by actors who dislike the results of formal 
institutions but are unable to change or openly violate those rules.  
3.) Substitutive—convergent and ineffective informal institutions.  These institutions 
exist in an environment where formal institutions are weak.  The results from 
substitutive informal institutions are similar as those expected from formal rules.   
4.) Competing—divergent and ineffective informal institutions.  Such institutions surface 
in situations where formal rules are not effective or enforced.  These informal 
institutions structure incentives in a manner that is incompatible with the aims of 
formal institutions.  If one adheres to the rules of a competing informal institution, 
then the tenants of the formal institution are violated.  
Policy networks may be classified as substitutive informal institutions.  Substitutive 
informal institutions subvert existing formal rules to produce results that are compatible, but 
possibly not achievable with formal institutions.  Helmke and Levitsky (2004) note that often 
substitutive institutions emerge where state structures are weak.  In this case, policy networks fill 
the void of an ineffective central government in creating and propelling reform policy.  
Furthermore, as Helmke and Levitksy assert, informal institutions such as these may exist and 
dominate political processes because the pursuit of goals is not considered publicly acceptable.  
They write, “Because they are relatively inconspicuous, informal institutions allow actors to 
pursue activities—ranging from the unpopular to the illegal—that are unlikely to stand the test of 
public scrutiny” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 730).  Also, the informal character of policy 
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networks and the way they operate serve to expedite the reform process.  Helmke and Levitsky 
note that actors often develop norms and procedures that expedite their work or address problems 
not anticipated by formal rules.  Political actors working within the formal institutional context 
of reform may permit the existence and dominance of policy networks in order to speed up the 
reform process. In sum, policy networks as a type of informal institution that serve as surrogates 
for formal institutions in the pursuit of market reform. 
Focusing on policy networks as informal substitutive institutions offers a sound account 
of economic liberalization in Latin America by redirecting attention to the formation and 
implementation of reform.  There are several ways this particular analysis addresses the 
shortcomings of the competing explanations for reform, while adding value to the body of 
literature on market reform.  First, the institutional and macroeconomic literatures emphasize the 
obstacles or conditions hindering reform while disregarding the actors impacting policy.  Unlike 
these approaches, the informal institutions perspective concentrates on the carriers of reform 
(policy networks) during the formation and implementation of market policy.  However, formal 
institutions are not discarded; rather, the informal institutions approach integrates the 
consideration of these structures into the theoretical framework by assessing their effectiveness 
and intended outcomes.  Second, similar to the international pressures literature, the analysis of 
the informal institutions of policy networks considers market reform a process that incorporates 
foreign lenders and investors.  In addition to these international influences, domestic players 
within policy networks play key roles in the formation and direction of the reform process.  
Third, the informal institutions explanation treats the state as a formal institution that affects 
reform, unlike the pluralist approach.  Nevertheless, the societal interests championed by the 
pluralist literature are not ignored.  Interests are filtered through policy networks and shape 
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reform via these informal institutions.  Finally, embedding policy networks within the theory of 
informal institutions addresses criticism waged against the policy networks literature.   
Critics claim that policy networks explanations fail to fully consider where technocratic 
power originates (Schneider 2004).  Indeed, finance ministers owe their positions and power to 
the executives that appointed them.  Although the policy networks literature may neglect this, 
analysis from the vantage point that policy networks are informal substitutive institutions 
demonstrates that executives may tap into these informal networks to achieve rapid economic 
reform.  Executives inheriting weak formal state structures from previous regimes may chose to 
empower policy networks in order to expedite the liberalization process.  In other words, 
executives and legislatures supporting the president may permit these informal institutions to 
take on a substitutive role so that neoliberal policies are more quickly implemented.  On this 
Bates writes, “Technocratic power and good policy may well go together…but the former does 
not cause the latter.  Rather, the relationship is the result of the decision of politicians to delegate 
political power to otherwise powerless experts so as to secure economically superior public 
policy” (Bates 1994: 30).  Unlike existing qualitative policy networks literature, the framing of 
policy networks as substitutive informal institutions accounts for the will of the executive in the 
reform process. 
This theoretical framework offers a more complete explanation for economic reform in 
Latin America.  The consideration of policy networks as informal institutions demonstrates how 
economic reform is formulated and implemented.  Policy networks bring together technocrats 
and societal interests, specifically the business sector, in negotiation with international actors to 
create an economic reform agenda.  These networks serve as substitutes for weak formal 
institutions that are incapable of generating and implementing cohesive policies.  Placing policy 
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networks in the context of substitutive informal institutions offers a comprehensive description 
of how these networks propel and compel economic liberalization.  Furthermore, this theoretical 
account of market reform exceeds competing approaches by considering the actors responsible 




To assess the effects of political and economic variables on policy choice, particularly the 
influence of policy networks, I analyze two indices of economic reform provided by Morley, et 
al (1999).  The first index, general reform, is a composite of trade, domestic financial reform, 
international financial liberalization, tax reform, and privatization.  The general reform index 
adds the values for the reform variables and divides it by five for each country in a given year, 
producing a scale of zero to one.  This general reform index offers a representation of the overall 
economic liberalization trends.  Additionally, I examine privatization independently.  The 
privatization index is a measure of the degree of privatization, and like general reform is a scale 
of zero to one.  Zero corresponds to the case with the least amount of reform for any country year 
among the period and countries considered.  One is identified with the most reformed of the 
country years in the entire sample.10   
Analysis of both general reform and privatization permits the identification of the 
explanatory variables that are most relevant to the privatization process specifically and reform 
in general.  Due to the complicated nature of the reform process as well as the aggregate nature 
of the index of general reform, it may be the case that the results show privatization entails a 
political process that differs from general reform.  Comparison of privatization to general reform 
produces a thorough description and explanation of the economic reform process in Latin 
America, and permits us to make conclusions regarding the role and impact of policy networks. 
The selection of explanatory variables is drawn from the existing institutional, pluralist, 
                                                 
10 These indices are widely employed in the study of economic reform, for instance, Biglaiser and Brown 
(forthcoming), Walton (2004), Behrman, et al. (2000), Wibbels and Arce (2003), and others. 
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macroeconomic, international, and policy networks literature.11  My primary variable of 
interest—policy networks—seeks to rectify the shortcomings of the policy networks literature by 
offering a quantitative measure that takes into account the executive’s use and empowerment of 
these groups to advance reform.  
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Policy Networks 
Policy Networks: The policy networks variable I have adopted incorporates a measure of 
the two most important components of policy networks—finance minister and business interests.  
The policy networks literature contends that the foremost element of a policy network is the 
finance minister.  On this, Teichman writes, “The most important technocratic policy network is 
concentrated in the ministry or ministries in charge of macroeconomic policy (usually the 
Finance Ministry or the central bank), and during the height of the market reform process, and 
even thereafter, the economic policy clique and its network predominate other networks” 
(Teichman 2001:19).  Furthermore, Schneider adds, “Almost all variants of policy [networks] 
start with top officials in economic ministries (such as the minister of finance)…” (Schneider 
2004: 473). Working in conjunction with the technocratic team found in the ministry of finance 
is the business sector.  The private business sector is given a central role in shaping economic 
policy (Teichman 2001).  Therefore, a policy networks variable necessitates the measurement of 
two parts—the finance minister and the business sector. 
To capture adequately the power vested in the finance ministry, I adapt the central bank 
literature that demonstrates the frequency of turnovers of the central bank governor provides a 
more meaningful indicator of central bank authority than formal institutional analysis (Maxfield, 
                                                 
11 For the descriptive statistics of the variables and observations used in the regression analysis, see Appendix A. 
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1994).12  Cukierman (1992) refers to this measure as the “informal authority” of the governor.  In 
the same vein, this measure of tenure may be transferred to the finance minister as an indicator of 
the informal authority residing in this position.  Therefore, employing data from Keesing’s 
Record of World Events combined with additional country sources, I have estimated the informal 
authority of the finance minister by calculating the number of turnovers within this position for 
each country year.  For example, if two finance ministers are instituted into the office in a given 
year, this is coded 2; if 1 finance minister takes office, then the year is coded 1; if the incumbent 
finance minister retains the position, the observation is coded 0.  Finally, the turnover rate is 
multiplied by -1 to facilitate the interpretation of this measure.   
The business sector may be measured as exports as a share of gross domestic product.  
Remmer (1998) contends that the nature of the exporting sector captures the influence of the 
business sector.  She writes, “the single most powerful source of domestic support for market-
oriented reforms…may be expected to come from exporting interests, whose political influence 
will vary with that of the sector’s relative economic importance and capacity for political 
organization” (Remmer 1998: 42).  Therefore, the impact of business interests varies according 
to the strength of the exporting sector, and the business sector component of policy networks is 
best depicted as such.  The final measure of policy networks is the product of finance minister 
informal authority and exports as a share of GDP.13  The data on exports as share of GDP are 
taken from World Development Indicators (2004) and lagged one year.14   
                                                 
12 Maxfield (1994) contends this is particularly true for developing nations where the turnover rates are more 
frequent and the economy more volatile. 
13 Policy networks is measured as finance minister turnover * exports/GDP.  It should be noted that exports/GDP is 
also included in my model as a test of pluralist theory.  Although exports/GDP appears twice in the model, the 
policy networks variable is not an interaction term.  Policy networks is not constructed nor treated in this model as a 
multiplication interaction variable.  Both this measures are included according to theory.  Therefore, I do not believe 
this model violates the principles of multiplicative interaction terms (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005). 
14 For additional information regarding the construction of this variable, see Appendix B.  
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In sum, the strength and influence of the policy network depends upon: 1.) the authority 
vested in the finance minister office (measured by the turnover rate of the finance minister 
position) and 2.) the strength of business interests (measured by the exporting sector).  A policy 
network led by a finance minister with great informal authority, evidenced and produced by the 
many years in office, in conjunction with strong business sector, captured by a large amount of 
exports, is expected to be correlated with greater economic reform.  In this scenario, not only 
will the finance minister be given the opportunity to formulate and pursue long-term economic 
policy, but the business sector will also have a vested interest and the capabilities to support such 
policies which open up the national market.   
Institutional 
 Regime:  Conventional wisdom contends that economic reform is more easily 
implemented under authoritarian rule (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Weyland 1998).  It is argued 
that authoritarian leaders are insulated from public sentiment and may implement unpopular and 
often painful economic policy without the consent of the populace.  In contrast, democratic 
regimes may find it difficult to pursue market reform in the face of popular protest.  Another line 
of argument focuses on the positive relationship between democracy and reform, contending that 
democracies better protect property rights and more efficiently distribute resources (Biglaiser 
and Danis 2002).15  This protection and efficiency creates a friendly investment climate, thereby 
attracting foreign capital.  Due to the conflicting hypotheses in the literature, I make no 
assumptions on the direction of the relationship between regime and privatization.  To test this 
relationship, I include a continuous measure of regime type based on the Polity IV dataset 
(Jaggers and Gurr 1995).  This dataset reports two scores, one reflects the degree of 
                                                 
15 Przeworksi, et al. (2000) in their study of economic growth concur that democracies better protect property rights 
and allocate resources.  
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authoritarianism of a regime (AUTOC), and the other represents the degree of democracy 
(DEMOC).  Both indicators range from 0 to 10, with 10 corresponding to the most authoritarian 
or democratic.  In order to create a more continuous measure, I subtract the autocracy score from 
the democracy score.  The resulting measure ranges from –10 to 10, with –10 being the least 
democratic and 10 indicating a high level of democratization. 
Federalism and Total Veto Players: Due to the aggregate nature of regime type, it is 
difficult to make inferences regarding its impact on reform.  However, looking at sub-regime 
factors, particularly federalism, provides insight into the institutions that may hinder or facilitate 
economic liberalization.  Federal systems increase the number of veto players in government 
thereby creating a potential obstacle to reform.16  On this, Samuels and Mainwaring write, 
“…federalism usually adds more ‘veto players’ to democratic politics, and hence…major policy 
reform at the national level is likely to be more difficult in federal systems, other things equal” 
(Samuels and Mainwaring 2002: 86).  Therefore, it is expected that federalism is negatively 
related to economic reform.  To demonstrate the effects of federalism on economic policy, I use 
a composite measure of five federalism indicators taken from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001).  The resultant scale ranges from 0 to 7, with 0 representing a lack 
of federal institutional characteristics and 7 indicating a highly federal state.17   
To further tease out the number of veto players, I have included an interaction between 
federalism and party system fragmentation (described below), termed “total veto players”.  Some 
scholars argue federalism has an indirect effect on the number of veto players, therefore an 
                                                 
16 Samuels and Mainwaring (2002: 87) elaborate on the term veto players: “Tsebelis (1995) developed the notion of 
veto players to refer to institutional or political actors whose agreement is required to advance a policy decision.  
With more veto players, negotiations are more complex and policy stability should be greater, and conversely policy 
reform should be more difficult to achieve.”   
17 For a full description of the composite federalism variable see Appendix B.  
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interaction between this variable and party fragmentation is appropriate to capture the total 
number of veto players present in the government (Gibson 2004).  This line of argument 
contends federalism influences the political system through “the powers and political resources 
imparted to political actors located at different points in the federal structure”, and therefore 
creating more veto players (Gibson 2004: 21).  The inherent decentralization of the federal 
system impacts the nature of party system and the structures of incentives for politicians.  In 
sum, federal systems experience a greater number of veto players as both a direct and indirect 
result of their institutional arrangements.  To fully represent the number of total veto players in a 
system, it is necessary to include an interaction between federalism and party fragmentation.  I 
expect as the number of total veto players increases, the less reform is undertaken.  
Party System Fragmentation and Polarization:  Party system fragmentation and political 
polarization of the legislature are obstacles to reform.  Fragmentation of the party system 
signifies a multiparty system with a number of parties beyond the effective number.18  Consistent 
with Haggard and Kaufman (1995), I contend the most important veto players in presidential 
systems are congressional parties.  Therefore, as the number of parties increases beyond the 
effective number, the amount of contending veto players grows, thereby creating impediments to 
the coordination needed to initiate reform.  I hypothesize that the higher the number of domestic 
veto players, the less governments engage in economic reform (see Tsebelis 1995).  The 
effective number of parties is measured using the Laakso and Taagepara index.19  The party 
system fragmentation variable is taken from Roberts and Wibbels (1999). 
                                                 
18 The effective number of parties is an indicator that counts parties after weighting them by size; a higher score 
indicates a higher likelihood of governance by coalition (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). 
19 This index is calculated on the basis of partisan distribution in lower houses of national congresses.  The measure 
is calculated as:  1/Ss2, where s = the share of seats of each party in congress.  Electoral data were taken from 
Nohlen (1993) and the Europa World Year Book. 
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Similar to party system fragmentation, polarization captures the obstacles to reform 
present in the legislature.  Rather than a measure of veto players, polarization is a proxy for the 
ideological distance among legislators.  The greater the distance among parties, the more 
difficult it becomes to pass economic reform legislation.  I adopt the polarization measure from 
the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001) that denotes the ideological orientation 
of the president’s party and the largest opposition party in the legislature on a scale of – 1 to 1.  
A score of -1 indicates a leftist ideological orientation; 0 represents center ideology; and 1 
signifies the conservative ideology of the right.  The absolute value of the greatest distance 
between the president’s party and the largest opposition party is recorded as a score of 
polarization.  Larger numbers indicate a greater ideological distance and hence more 
polarization.  Therefore, I hypothesize that the greater the polarization existent in the legislature, 
the less reform.   
 Executive-Controlled Legislature: Neoliberal reform is facilitated when the president’s 
party controls the legislature (Biglaiser and Brown forthcoming).  An executive should expect 
the support of his own party in policy initiatives (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).  To measure 
the effect of executive-controlled legislature, I employ the Database of Political Institutions’ 
dichotomous measure recording observations in which the president’s party controls all relevant 
houses (Beck, et al. 2001).  A score of 1 represents instances in which the executive’s party has 
an absolute majority in the houses with lawmaking powers; and 0 otherwise.  
Executive Strength: Executive strength is manifested in a president with great amount of 
constitutional powers.  Great executive strength empowers leaders to overcome political 
stalemates and opposition to reform.  Haggard and Kaufman (1995) claim a centralized executive 
is needed for successful initiation of liberalization reforms.  In the same vein, Mainwaring and 
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Shugart (1997) argue a “strong” executive facilitates the initiation of market reform.  A strong 
executive may “shape the policy output of the system regardless of whether they head a party or 
bloc of parties that controls the legislative majority” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 13).  I 
apply Shugart and Carey’s (1992) operationalization of presidential powers to assess the strength 
of the executive.  This measure evaluates the legislative and nonlegislative powers of the 
president.  The legislative powers considered include package veto/override, partial 
veto/override, decree, exclusive introduction of legislation, budgetary powers, and proposal of 
referenda.  In addition, cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal, censure and dissolution of assembly 
are incorporated as nonlegislative powers.  Each measure is scored on a scale of 0-4, with 0 
indicating the least amount of power and 4 the most.  The composite scale of executive strength 
ranges from 0-40.  I hypothesize that greater executive strength is linked to higher levels of 
economic reform. 
Executive Ideology: Presidential ideology may influence the government’s reform 
agenda.  Historically, in Latin American leftist parties have been nationalist parties maintaining 
ties organized labor and the middle class (Kingstone and Young 2005).  The left’s ties to labor, 
local capitalist groups, and the middle class is in direct opposition with landowners, finance 
capitalists, and foreign investors.  As a consequence, leftist executives have traditionally 
promoted more government intervention in the economy, in the form of state enterprises and the 
allocation of resources to labor, domestic business, and the middle class (Kingstone and Young 
2005).  Thus, leftist presidents are expected to create obstacles to the reform process.  To control 
for executive preference, I include a measure of executive ideology that categorizes presidents on 
a left-right continuum independent of party orientation.  A score of 1 corresponds with leftist 
ideological orientation; 2 represents the center; and 3 captures right-leaning executives.  The data 
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are obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001).  I expect the greater 
the ideology score (representing a right-leaning executive), the more reform undertaken20. 
Reverse Honeymoon:  Part of the political environment shaping reform is the electoral 
calendar.  Although some literature claims reform is most easily initiated after elections due to 
the ability of the new executive to blame bad conditions on the past president, I hypothesize 
economic reform takes place in the latter years of a presidential term (Franzese, Jr. 2002; 
Remmer 1993; Persson 2002).  This assumption is based on several observations.  First, 
following Biglaiser and Brown (2003), I expect a delay in the process of market reform 
following an election.  Elections transform the composition of the executive office, the 
legislature, and cabinets, making fresh political arrangements necessary.  The formation of new 
legislative coalitions and agreements as well as economic policy agendas delay the initiation of 
economic reform.  Second, the domestic economic climate is not conducive for reform, 
specifically privatization, immediately following an election.  Foreign investors have little 
confidence in a nation’s economy and economic reform during a period of transition.  A 
president may create a favorable investment climate, but this takes time and legislation, which 
usually takes effect in the latter years of the executive term.  Due to delayed reform and an 
uncertain investment climate following elections, I expect reverse honeymoon to be positively 
related to economic liberalization.  This variable is coded as years since the last election.  The 
data are obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001).  
 
                                                 
20 The possibility of including an interaction between executive strength and executive ideology was considered.  
Such an interaction would demonstrate the manner in which the structure of executive strength aids the translation of 
the president’s ideological preferences.  However, when including this interaction in the regression model, the 
variable performed in the opposite direction.  This suggests that presidents with great powers and leftist ideologies 
pursue more reform than a strong conservative executive.  Although this relationship is contrary to conventional 
wisdom, it has surfaced in other works, primarily Biglaiser and Brown (forthcoming).  Therefore, this interaction 
was rejected as an addition to my model.   
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Pluralist 
 Left-Labor Power: Traditionally, labor embodies strong opposition to market reform.  
Fearing a drop in employment, as well as the weakening of their bargaining power, labor unions 
present a powerful force working against economic reform.  In support of this, Nelson states, 
“Among the urban popular classes, unionized labor is usually best-organized to defend its 
interests” (Nelson 1992: 245).  To measure labor power, I use a left-labor index that reports the 
level of unionization, weighted for militancy of left-labor parties.  This data are taken from 
Roberts and Wibbels (1999).  I expect left-labor strength to be associated with less reform.  
Business Interests:  In contrast to labor, business interests are the strongest societal force 
in favor of neoliberal reform.  The business sector has much to gain from the opening of the 
market and has the ability to create great pressure for economic reform.  Consistent with 
Remmer (1998) and Biglaiser and DeRouen (2004), I utilize a measure of exports as a share of 
GDP to capture the effect.  The support and pressure exerted by the business community is 
manifested in a rise of exports.  Therefore, it is expected that business interests, measured as 
exports as a share of GDP, are positively related to market reform.  This data are obtained from 
the World Development Indicators (2004) and is lagged one year.    
International Pressures 
External Aid: To adequately capture the forces influencing reform, the inclusion of 
external factors, particularly international pressures in favor of economic liberalization, is 
necessary.  International financial institutions are a source of immense pressure promoting 
market opening and privatization of state-owned-enterprises (Weyland 2004).  To gain access to 
international resources, governments are required to pursue reform (Stallings 1992).  Economic 
reform serves as a signal to lenders that the government is taking steps to open the market and 
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attract foreign investment and capital (Biglaiser and Brown forthcoming).    Therefore, I expect 
international pressures for reform to be associated with higher levels of liberalization.  To 
evaluate the effect of international pressures, I use a measure of official development assistance, 
defined as net disbursements of loans made on concessional terms by official agencies.  This data 
are taken from the World Development Indicators (2004) and is lagged one year.  
Macroeconomic 
 GDP per Capita and GDP Growth:  I include an indicator of the relative wealth of the 
country, measured as per capita gross domestic product.  Higher per capita GDP may lead to a 
“favorable public mood” (Manzetti 1999: 18) allowing market reform.  Moreover, as noted by 
several scholars, wealthier nations may be able to offset the costs of liberalization to individuals, 
making reform less painful.21  It is expected that high per capita GDP is positively related to 
economic reform.  I also include a measure of the relative size of the economy, indicated by the 
country’s GDP growth.  Small economies are more likely to pursue market reform due to their 
inability to resist globalization pressures.  Both measures are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (2004) and calculated in constant 1995 US dollars.  GDP per capita is 
logged and lagged, and GDP growth is lagged.22 
Inflation:  It is important to consider the effect of inflation on economic reform.  Not only 
does inflation affect the behavior and choices of politicians and citizens, it is a crucial 
determinant of a nation’s investment climate.  Recall that the majority of the literature on 
inflation argues high inflation is related to greater reform (Weyland 1998; Biglaiser and 
DeRouen 2004).  Although this is a valid argument, inflation in the context of the investment 
                                                 
21 Brune and Garrett (2000) as well as Biglaiser and Brown (2003) argue nations with higher per capita GDP can 
more easily afford reform. 
22 GDP per capita is logged in order to pull outlying observations closer to the bulk of the data, thereby creating a 
normal distribution of the variable. 
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environment should also be considered.  Countries with low inflation rates are expected to have a 
friendlier and more stable investment climate, and thus have a greater opportunity to engage in 
market opening policies.  Moreover, as Biglaiser and DeRouen posit, “Reforms that include . . . 
privatizing in order to reduce flows of government revenue to loss-making enterprises . . . are 
needed to limit the possible causes of inflation” (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004: 570).  Thus, 
inflation acts as an incentive as well as a condition to economic reform.  I expect inflation, acting 
as proxy for investment climate, to be negatively linked to economic reform.  To operationalize 
this variable, I take the absolute value of the logged, lagged consumer price index from the 
World Development Indicators (2004).23   
External Debt and Current Account Balance:  External debt and current account balance 
serve as important proxies indicating the economic pressure for neoliberal reform.  A 
government facing great debt and current account deficits is prompted to initiate reform.  For 
example, increasing external debt may support the case for privatization, as the sale of state-
owned-enterprises generates income to pay creditors.  The need to reduce deficits is a practical 
motivation to reform, one that “can convince even nationalist leaders of the necessity [of 
reform]”, contends Manzetti (1993: 433).  Following Biglaiser and Brown (2003), I expect high 
levels of external debt and current account balances to encourage economic reform.  Total 
external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term 
debt, IMF credit, and short-term debt.  Current account balance is defined as the sum of net 
exports of goods and services, income, and current transfers as a percentage of GDP.  Both 
indicators are in current U.S. dollars.  Both measures are taken from the World Development 
Indicators (2004) and lagged one year. 
 
                                                 
23 Inflation is logged in order to correct for the skewed sample distribution that hyperinflation creates.  
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Control 
Time:  I incorporate the measure of time to capture the variation of economic reform 
throughout the region across a sixteen year period.  It is important to control for time because, as 
Biglaiser and Brown note, this period is unique—“the first half…is marked by wrenching 
economic crisis, followed by a very slow and gradual recovery” (Biglaiser and Brown 2003: 84).  
Thus, I expect a trend of increasing market reform as the years of the dataset progress.24   
Table 3: Summary of Hypotheses 
Approach Variable Hypothesis 
Policy Networks Policy Networks Stronger policy networks are correlated with more reform.  
Regime No expected relationship. 
Federalism Higher scores of federalism are associated with less reform. 
Party System Fragmentation More fragmentation of the party system is correlated with less reform. 
Total Veto Players  The greater the total number of veto players, the less reform expected. 
Polarization Greater polarization of the party system is related to less reform. 
Executive-Controlled Legislature More reform with an executive-controlled legislature is expected. 
Executive Strength Greater executive power is associated with more reform. 
Executive Ideology Right-leaning executives are linked to more reform. 
Institutional 
Reverse Honeymoon The more years since the last election, the more reform. 
Left-Labor Power Greater left-labor power is correlated with less reform. Pluralist 
Business Interests t-1 The larger the exporting sector, the more reform. 
International External Aid t-1 Greater international pressures are linked to more reform. 
GDP per Capita (log) t-1 Higher levels of GDP per capita are correlated with more reform. 
GDP Growth t-1 The smaller the economy, the more reform expected.  
Inflation (log) t-1 Greater levels of inflation are associated with less reform. 
External Debt t-1 Higher degrees of external debt are related to more reform. 
Current Account Balance t-1 High current account deficits are linked to more reform. 
Macroeconomic 
Time Increasing number of years is associated with more reform. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
The data produce a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) unbalanced data set for 14 Latin 
American countries with multiple annual entries ranging from 1980 to 1995.  Because the data 
are TSCS, auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity are a concern.  OLS estimates of the standard 
                                                 
24 For a summary of the independent variables and expected relationships, see Table 3. 
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errors may be misleading due to panel heteroskedasticity or auto-correlation.  Beck and Katz 
(1996) propose a solution to these problems.  They suggest using OLS with panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSEs) once serial correlation has been removed from the disturbances.  
Following Achen (2000), I deal with auto-correlation by adopting the Prais-Winsten 
transformation.  Consistent with Beck and Katz’s advice, fixed-effects are used by including 
country dummies in the model. 
Also, all the economic control factors are lagged one year.25  This is reasonable 
considering economic developments take time to affect political decisions and policy outcomes.  
It also makes the model’s direction of causality explicit:  if the independent variables in year t-1 
are correlated with this year’s privatization, then I can infer with greater confidence that the 
direction of causality is in fact running from the factors specified on the right hand side of the 
equation to the dependent variable on the left-hand side.   
The general reform model is specified as follows: 
GENERAL REFORM = a + b1 policy networks + b2 regime + b3 federalism  
+ b4 party fragmentation + b5 total veto players + b6 polarization  
+ b7 executive-controlled legislature + b8 executive strength + b9 executive ideology 
+ b10 reverse honeymoon + b11 left-labor power + b12 exports/GDP t-1   
+ b13 external aid t-1  + b14 GDP per capita (log) t-1 + b15 GDP growth t-1    
+ b16 inflation (log) t-1 + b17 external debt t-1 + b18 current account balance t-1 
+ b19 time + b20 country dummies + e. 
The privatization model is specified as follows:   
PRIVATIZATION = a + b1 policy networks + b2 regime + b3 federalism  
+ b4 party fragmentation + b5 total veto players + b6 polarization  
+ b7 executive-controlled legislature + b8 executive strength + b9 executive ideology 
+ b10 reverse honeymoon + b11 left-labor power + b12 exports/GDP t-1   
+ b13 external aid t-1  + b14 GDP per capita (log) t-1 + b15 GDP growth t-1 
+ b16 inflation (log) t-1 + b17 external debt t-1 + b18 current account balance t-1 
+ b19 time + b20 country dummies + e. 
 
The models specified above serve to test the relative strength of the assumptions of recent 
research as well as present a cohesive framework in which the politics of economic reform may 
                                                 
25 For a theoretical discussion of this specification, see Hicks and Swank 1992. 
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be understood.  The resultant coefficients will provide estimates of the correlation between 
policy networks and the degree of general reform and privatization undertaken in a given year.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Results generated by the models described above are presented in Table 4.26  Both the 
general reform and privatization models demonstrate a strong and significant correlation between 
policy networks and economic reform.  Of the institutional variables included, federalism shows 
a significant relationship to general reform, and executive-controlled legislature is strongly 
associated with privatization.  As advanced by the pluralist literature, left-labor power is a 
significant correlate to general reform.  However, the international influence variable fails to 
produce a strong association with both reform types.  Finally, inflation and GDP per capita 
demonstrate the powrful influence of economic conditions on privatization.  Nonetheless, only 
external debt reaches significance in relation to general reform.  
GENERAL REFORM  
As hypothesized, policy networks are significantly and positively related to general 
reform.  Consistent with the theory, as well as recent studies, the regression results support the 
hypothesis that policy networks function as informal institutions in the reform process (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004; Wang 2000).  On this, Wang states, “…informal networks play an important 
role in maintaining political order and facilitating economic activities…” (Wang 2000: 531).  
Policy networks streamline the creation and implementation of reform policies.  As discussed  
previously, policy networks bring together technocrats, the business sector and the international 
community in formulating a reform agenda.  When economic reform measures are created by  
economists with the input of the private and international sectors, policies are market-friendly.  
Therefore, these measures are quickly accepted by foreign lenders and investors and integrated 
into the international market.  Moreover, the implementation of reform is facilitated when  
                                                 
26 Additional regressions including a recoded policy networks variable are reported in Appendix C to demonstrate 
the robustness of the results. 
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Table 4: The Factors Affecting Economic Reform in Latin America, 1980-1995 
 General Reform Privatization 
Policy Networks   0.001       
(2.63)*** 
  0.001 
(2.43)*** 




Federalism  -0.030 
(2.29)** 
 -0.008 
(0.43)   
Party Fragmentation   0.005 
(0.61) 
  0.002 
(0.36) 




Polarization   0.004 
(0.63) 
  0.007 
(0.98) 
Executive-Controlled Legislature  -0.004 
(0.23)   
  0.054 
(3.55)*** 








Reverse Honeymoon  -0.001 
(0.68) 
  0.004 
(1.35) 




Exports/GDP  t-1   0.001 
(0.83) 
  0.002 
(1.31) 




GDP per Capita (log) t-1    -0.061 
(0.73)   
  0.247 
(2.49)*** 
















Year   0.026 
(11.22)*** 
  0.001 
(0.65) 




R-Squared  .82  .88 
 
N  177  177 
Z scores appear in parentheses. 
***Z-scores significant at the .01 level; **Z-scores significant at the .05 level; *Z-scores significant at the .10 level. 
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propelled by policy networks.  Market reform is achieved either through congress-approved 
legislation, executive decree, or deals negotiated outside government channels (Manzetti 2003).  
In sum, the creation and implementation of general reform is eased by policy networks because it 
takes place in the political space of an informal institution.  As substitutive informal institutions, 
policy networks are free from political obstacles, demands for transparency, and popular protest 
and open to foreign investors and international influences in the pursuit of reform.  
 The regression results establish that policy networks significantly impact the reform 
process.  However with a coefficient of 0.0005, it seems as though they have a small substantive 
influence on general reform.  Predicted values of general reform for this variable clearly 
illustrate this (see Figure 1).  The predicted general reform score for a strong policy network is 
0.666.27  The predicted score for a weak policy network is not considerably different (0.636).  
When placed in the context of the total general reform implemented for the period studied, policy 
networks are only able to account for a small amount of change in general reform.28  
Nevertheless, their statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable supports the 
contention that they are crucial to the complicated process of reform. 
The sole institutional variable exhibiting a significant affect on general reform is 
federalism.  As hypothesized, the results suggest that federalism hinders the reform process 
(Samuels and Mainwaring 2002).  Federalist structures produce a large number of veto players,  
thereby fragmenting the system.  This greatly impedes the implementation of reform.  The 
federalism coefficient of 0.030 implies this variable substantially impacts reform.  This is 
demonstrated by the predicted general reform scores for federalism, as shown in Figure 2.  The  
                                                 
27 Recall that the policy networks with higher values indicate more turnover and instability, therefore policy 
networks with high scores are actually “weaker” groups.  The assigned policy networks value for the general reform 
predicted values is 0 for “strong” and -58 for “weak”.   
28 See Appendix D. General reform progressed from 0.543 to 0.824 during the 1980-1995 time period.  
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predicted general reform score for a non-federal system is significantly higher than a highly 
federalist system.  In the first case with a score of 0 on the federalism scale, general reform is 
predicted to be 0.738; in contrast, general reform is predicted to be 0.525 in a system scoring 7.  
Clearly, increased levels of federalist institutions produce less general reform.  
As argued by pluralist scholars (Frieden 1991; Nelson 1995), the influence of labor 
surfaces as a significant, and negative, correlate to general reform.  Market reform has 
potentially devastating effects on the labor sector.  Economic liberalization often leads to the loss 
of jobs, reduced wages, and increased cost of living.  Therefore, the labor sector has great 
incentives to mount opposition to economic reform.  The predicted values for general reform 
demonstrate this effect.  As seen in Figure 3, the predicted value for general reform when left-
labor  power is extremely low—at 5—is 0.698.  When left-labor power is strongest at 60, general 
reform decreases to a score of 0.616.29  Although this shift is not as substantial as seen with 
federalism, it clearly establishes that left-labor power reduces the level of implemented reform. 
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A country comparison of federalism and left-labor power reveals an interesting 
correlation—the majority of countries that have strong left-labor groups score high on the 
federalism scale.30  When considered jointly, left-labor and federalism greatly impede reform, as 
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illustrated by Figure 4.  The predicted value for general reform when left-labor is at its strongest 
and federalist institutions are abundant is 0.511.31  This is in sharp contrast to a scenario in which 
federalist institutions are absent—general reform increases to a score of 0.693.  This coupling of 
federalism and left-labor power produces the same trend when you consider the variation among 
scores with weak left-labor groups.  General reform is predicted to be 0.775 with weak left-labor 
groups and the absence of federalism.32  However, an increase on the federalism scale to 6 
reduces general reform to 0.600.  It is evident that the joint effect of federalism and left-labor 
power is damaging to general reform.  Due to the fact that all countries in the sample experience 
some level of left-labor opposition, and only three nations—Ecuador, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala—have no federalist institutions, this is an important association that bears much 
consequence on the analysis of the reform and deserves further research. 
The final variable showing a significant relationship to general reform is external debt.  
The relationship is negative, implying that increased external debt actually discourages reform.  
This finding is contrary to conventional wisdom which posits that high external debt creates 
incentives to reform in order to generate revenue to pay creditors.  However puzzling, this 
negative relationship is documented in other studies on neoliberal reform, specifically Biglaiser 
and DeRouen (2004) and Biglaiser and Brown (forthcoming).33  Future research should further 
examine this relationship, its magnitude, and impact on neoliberal reform by disaggregating the 
                                                 
31 The predicted values for this case utilized a fixed value of 60 for left-labor power and 6 for federalism.  Although 
the federalism scale ranges from 0-7, there are no instances in which an observation is coded 7 in the dataset.  
Therefore, in these illustrative examples reporting predicted values, 6 is the highest score assigned for federalism. 
32 The predicted values for this case utilized a fixed value of 5 for left-labor power. 
33 Biglaiser and DeRouen (2004) find a negative, although not significant, association between external debt and 
several reform indicators that comprise the general reform index—trade liberalization, financial reform, and tax 
reform.  Additionally, Biglaiser and Brown (forthcoming) discover a negative and significant correlation between 
debt and general reform (specifically financial reform).  Furthermore, the authors do provide an explanation of this 
relationship. 
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general reform index and taking into account country-specific factors that may affect the 
association between debt and reform.34 
 
 The regression results for the general reform model suggest that institutional, societal, 
and economic obstacles to reform are more influential than policy networks.  Policy networks, 
though significant, do not establish a substantial impact on general reform.  On the other hand, 
federalism and left-labor power demonstrate strong influences on the reform process.  
Furthermore, the instances in which both federalism and left-labor are strong suggest that these 
institutions pose great impediments to reform, particularly when jointly present in a system.  
Finally, the external debt variable suggests that high levels of debt encumber the reform process.    
PRIVATIZATION 
As with general reform, policy networks are significantly and positively linked to 
privatization (see Table 4).  As previously mentioned, policy networks acting as informal 
institutions facilitate the formulation and implementation of economic reform.  Specifically in 
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the context of privatization these informal networks ease the divestiture process by offering 
investment incentives to foreign capitalists.35  Unlike formal structures, informal institutions are 
able to bypass official channels, minimize the transaction costs of a sale, and offer protection and 
credibility to foreign investors.36  In this sense, policy networks serve as substitutive informal 
institutions in place of weak state structures (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).  These informal 
institutions are able to achieve what formal institutions cannot—state divestiture—by supporting 
the enforcement of property rights and promoting favorable deals with purchasers.  In sum, 
informal institutions bring about privatization by acting as substitutes for formal institutions and 
enhancing the investment climate through favorable negotiations with investors. 
The impact of policy networks may be seen in the predicted values for privatization.  
Figure 5 represents the impact of policy networks on privatization while holding constant all 
other variables.  As shown, the predicted privatization value for a strong policy network is 0.747, 
while a weak network yields a privatization score of 0.707.37  Clearly, there is an upward trend 
indicating more privatization with stronger policy networks.  When considering that the region 
experienced a shift from an average privatization score of 0.735 in 1980 to 0.800 in 1995, 
informal institutions account for a large amount of privatization initiated.38 
Of the political control variables included, executive-controlled legislature is the sole 
indicator significantly affecting privatization.  Consistent with institutional literature, the results 
provide evidence that a legislature controlled by the president’s party face less obstacles to  
                                                 
35 For an account of the investment incentives given to foreign capitalists by Argentine officials and businessmen, 
see Manzetti (2003). 
36 Biglaiser and Danis note (2002: 98)), “If the policy makers are economists who not only support the enforcement 
of property rights but also favor policies that benefit the private sector, this provides additional credibility for 
purchasers.”   
37 The predicted values were generated by assigning policy networks a value of 0 and -58, respectively.  
38 See Appendix C for information on the average privatization by year for the region.  
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reform (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Biglaiser and Brown forthcoming).  However, the 
importance of a presidential party majority is more meaningful when recent studies on fiscal  
 
discipline in Latin America are taken into account.  Hallerberg and Marier (2004) contend 
finance ministers play a crucial role in the budget process when supported by a majority in 
congress.  They write, “Yet whether the finance minister has any powers outside of the cabinet 
and beyond the initial proposal of the budget depends on the regularity of majorities behind the 
president in congress” (Halleberg and Marier 2004: 575).  In the case of privatization, I contend 
that the power of policy networks, which are led by the finance minister, is carried throughout 
the reform process via an executive-controlled legislature.  A congressional majority in support 
of the president permits the reforms formulated by policy networks to become legislation, 
usually by any means necessary.  It is often the case that the legislature gives the president 
unrestricted decree power in order to expedite market reform legislation.39  In support of this, 
Manzetti (1999: 92-3) notes that in Argentina privatizations were implemented through “decrees 
                                                 
39 Manzetti (2003: 318) notes, “Thus, in order to ‘democratize’ the market, many countries in Latin America 
indiscriminately used executive orders/emergency decrees (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) and 
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of necessity and emergency”, and Cavallo (finance minister from 1991-1996) “himself admitted 
that without the power of decrees he could have accomplish only 20 percent of his reforms.”  
Undoubtedly, an executive-controlled legislature is central to the reform process.  
The relationship between the informal institutions of policy networks, the legislature, and 
reform is best depicted by comparing the predicted values for privatization in a scenario where 
there exists an executive-controlled legislature and a strong policy network and a case in which 
the legislature is divided and there is a weak policy network.  The predicted privatization score 
for the first case is 0.780; the second, 0.685 (see Figure 6).40  When only considering the 
predicted privatization scores for executive-controlled legislature, it is clear that policy networks 
in conjunction with unified government advance the privatization process.  Privatization is 
predicted to be 0.718 with a legislature not controlled by the executive’s party.  On the other 
hand, when the president’s party controls all houses, privatization is expected to be 0.772.   
 
                                                 
40 The predicted values were generated by assigning policy networks a value of 0 and executive-controlled 
legislature 1 in the first case and policy networks a value of -58 and executive-controlled legislature 0 in the second 
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Although this is a considerable difference, it is not as great an impact as illustrated in the 
scenarios mentioned above.  Indeed, privatization is facilitated by the informal institutions of 
strong policy networks coupled with the formal institution of an executive-controlled legislature. 
 The economic variables exhibiting a strong correlation with privatization are inflation 
and GDP per capita.  Although GDP per capita may facilitate economic liberalization by 
offsetting the costs of reform, both indicators serve as representatives of the investment climate.  
High inflation signals an unstable economic environment to investors, making the sale of state-
owned-enterprises to foreign capitalists difficult.  Similarly, GDP per capita indicates the health 
of the economy to potential investors.  High per capita GDP implies a strong and stable 
economy, one that can afford the costs of reform domestically and one in which investments 
would not be risky.  Therefore, the negative relationship between inflation and privatization and 
the positive correlation between GDP per capita and privatization is best understood in terms of 
the investment climate. 
 Inflation stalls the privatization process.  Predicted values for privatization demonstrate 
that as inflation increases from 1% to 5%, privatization drops by 0.021 points.41  Furthermore, a 
rise in inflation from 10% to 100% reduces the amount of privatization initiated by 0.029.  As 
noted by Table 5, the majority of the effect of inflation is felt when inflation is increasing in the 
0-50% range.42  Beyond 50%, privatization is minimally affected by rising inflation.  
Nonetheless, the regression results validate the idea that inflation hampers the privatization 
process by tainting the investment climate. 
                                                 
41 Predicted values were generated using the logged values of inflation and then translated into percentages for 
discussion purposes. A change from 1% inflation to 5% represents about a one standard deviation increase (1.497); a 
shift from 10% inflation to 100% is an increase of about two standard deviation units.  
42 Summary statistics reveal 0-50% inflation accounts for 69.75% of the observations; 50.1-100% inflation occurs 
with 12.18% of the observations; 100.1-200% inflation rates are shown in 7.98% of the data points; and the 
remaining 10.08% of the data contains inflation rates of 200.1-15,000%. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Inflation on Privatization 
Percent Inflation (CPI) Log of Inflation Predicted Privatization 
1 0.000 0.788 
5 1.609 0.767 
10 2.303 0.758 
20 2.996 0.749 
30 3.401 0.744 
40 3.689 0.740 
50 3.912 0.738 
60 4.094 0.735 
70 4.248 0.733 
80 4.382 0.732 
90 4.500 0.730 
100 4.605 0.729 
150 5.011 0.724 
200 5.298 0.720 
 
 In contrast to inflation, per capita GDP strengthens the domestic investment climate.  
High per capita GDP signals to foreign investors that the national economy is healthy and stable.  
This allows the privatization process to progress.  The coefficient for GDP per capita suggests 
this indicator greatly impacts privatization.  This is supported by the predicted values for 
privatization shown in Figure 7.  As GDP per capita increases, privatization escalates.  A shift 
from $650 per capita GDP to $1000 improves privatization by 0.106.  Furthermore, an increase 
of $1000, from per capita GDP of $1000 to $2000, produces a 0.171 rise in privatization.43  
Clearly, higher levels of GDP per capita are correlated with higher scores of privatization.   
The results reveal that informal institutions serve as substitutive structures when the 
executive party controls the legislature, inflation is low, and GDP per capita is high.  In short,  
informal institutions are able to advance the privatization process when the investment climate is  
                                                 
43 Predicted values were generated using the logged values of GDP per capita and then translated into real dollar 
amounts for discussion purposes.  A change from $650 GDP per capita to $1000 GDP per capita represents about a 
one standard deviation increase (0.554); a shift from $1000 GDP per capita to $2000 GDP per capita is an increase 




good and the legislature is not divided.  As an example, comparing the privatization scores for 
Brazil 1991 and Argentina 1995 demonstrates the disparity between the former—a case in which 
informal institutions are strong, the legislature is controlled by the executive’s party, inflation is 
low, and GDP per capita is high—and the latter—a case in which these factors are lacking.  
Brazil 1991 is characterized by weak informal institutions, a legislature not controlled by the 
executive’s party, high inflation, and moderate GDP per capita.44  These conditions produced 
low privatization—a score of 0.669.  On the other hand, the case of Argentina 1995 is typified by 
strong informal institutions, an executive-controlled legislature, low inflation, and high GDP per 
capita.  In 1995 Argentina experienced a privatization score of 1.00.  Undoubtedly, informal 
institutions when embedded within a good investment climate and empowered by a unified 
legislature are critical to the privatization process.  It is within this political and economic 
context that policy networks successfully replace formal institutions in the pursuit of reform.  
                                                 
44 Brazil in 1991 experienced the following: policy networks at -8.199, divided government, logged inflation of 
7.989, and logged GDP per capita of 8.313.  Argentina 1995 experienced the following: policy networks at 0, an 
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Figure 7: The Effect of GDP  
per Capita on Privatization
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The manner in which policy networks work as substitutes for formal institutions may be 
further explored by a regression model that removes the policy networks variable.  This model 
(see Table 6) clearly demonstrates that policy networks work as substitutive informal institutions 
in the privatization process.  When policy networks are absent from the model, the democracy 
variable emerges as a significant and negative correlate to privatization.  As many contend, this 
negative relationship may be due to popular protest in opposition to reform.  However, in light of 
informal institutions, the importance of this regime variable may also be interpreted as protection 
of property rights and distribution of resources (Biglaiser and Danis 2002).  Although the 
majority of the countries in the sample are coded democracies throughout the time period 
studied, these states may not have an effective rule of law, specifically formal rules and 
procedures ensuring property rights and enforcing contracts.45  Thus, the negative relationship 
between democracy and privatization may not be a remnant of popular protest against reform, 
but an indicator of weak states unable to achieve neoliberal reform.  In this vein, it is clear that 
the introduction of the informal institution variable—policy networks—into the regression 
analysis produces a significant relationship with privatization, precisely because these 
institutions serve as surrogates for weak formal structures not able to guarantee rule of law, 
property rights, and contracts during the reform process.   
DISCUSSION 
 The results demonstrate that policy networks, institutions, interests, and economic 
conditions are principal determinants of reform.  This analysis validates the central role of policy 
networks posited by informal institutions and policy networks literature.  Moreover, the findings  
 
                                                 
45 The average polity score for the countries in the sample is as follows: Argentina—4.5; Bolivia—6.81; Brazil—
4.25; Chile—0.25; Costa Rica—10.0; Dominican Republic—5.88; Ecuador—8.75; El Salvador—2.81; 
Guatemala— -0.50; Mexico— -1.00; Peru—5.38; Uruguay—4.44; and Venezuela—8.75.  
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Table 6: Factors Affecting Privatization in Latin America, 1980-1995 
 Coefficient Z-score 
Policy Networks   
Regime -0.006      (1.73)* 
Federalism -0.010      (0.51)   
Party Fragmentation  0.002      (0.31) 
Total Veto Players -0.000      (0.09) 
Polarization  0.007      (0.92) 
Executive-Controlled Legislature 0.058       (3.74)** 
Executive Strength -0.006      (1.09) 
Executive Ideology -0.007      (0.88) 
Reverse Honeymoon  0.002      (0.80) 
Left-Labor Power -0.001      (1.02) 
Business Interests t-1  0.002      (1.13) 
External Aid t-1 -0.000     (0.58) 
GDP per Capita (log) t-1    0.255      (2.52)** 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.000      (0.43) 
Inflation (log) t-1   -0.012 (1.73)* 
External Debt t-1 -0.000 (1.34) 
Current Account Balance t-1 -0.001 (0.51) 
Year  0.001 (0.70) 
Constant -1.237 (1.39) 
N 177  
R-Squared .87  
**Z-scores significant at the .01 level; *Z-scores significant at the .05 level 
 
maintain that institutional, pluralist, and economic indicators remain a fundamental part of the  
examination of neoliberal reform.  
 First, the findings for the general reform and privatization models support the primary 
explanatory variable of interest.  Both models highlight the role of policy networks in the reform 
process.  Although the results do not support a substantive impact of these informal institutions 
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on general reform, the significance of the variable cannot be overlooked.  The general reform 
model as specified does not provide detailed insight into the exact role these informal networks 
play in relation to general reform beyond their facilitation of the creation and implementation of 
reform agendas.  Due to the aggregate nature of general reform, a broad relationship has been 
established, but the mechanism and the magnitude of the relationship is not clear, particularly for 
the specific types of reform that this index captures.  However, for the privatization model, it 
may be claimed with greater certainty that policy networks do serve as informal substitutive 
institutions in the privatization process.  The results corroborate the theoretical postulation that 
policy networks propel the reform process by enhancing the investment climate.  Undoubtedly, 
this analysis has demonstrated that policy networks do help shape the course of economic 
liberalization.  
 Second, the results of both models underscore the idea that institutions are instrumental in 
the reform process.  The general reform model produced significant relationships between 
federalism and neoliberal reform.  These correlations demonstrated that federalism has a 
substantial impact on general reform.  Additionally, executive-controlled legislature surfaced as 
a strong correlate to privatization.  Clearly, institutions remain necessary to the explanation of 
policy-making and implementation of reform.   
 Third, interests remain a salient feature of the reform process.  The significance of the 
left-labor power variable in the general reform model evidences that societal preferences do 
impact reform.  This is particularly interesting in light of recent studies that posit neoliberalism 
has depoliticized society (Kurtz 2004; Weyland 2002).  It seems that for the period following 
reform initiation until 1995, unions and leftist political parties remained a vital societal force 
opposing reform.  Although this is true for the general reform model, left-labor power is not 
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significant for privatization reform.  It may be the case that the privatization process was 
adequately shielded from social opposition or that labor unions were successfully quieted.  
Nonetheless, this finding demonstrates that interests must be considered in the analysis of 
market-oriented reform.  
 Fourth, the results of this study bear out that the economic environment surrounding 
reform is crucial.  The strong associations between external debt, inflation, and GDP per capita 
with reform illustrate the effect of the economy on politics.  Not only do economic conditions 
determine the investment climate under which market reforms take place, they also shape 
political attitudes and calculations in relation to economic liberalization.  Economic indicators 
continue to be important components of the study of reform.  
 The findings here demonstrate that policy networks do serve as substitutive informal 
institutions in the reform process.  These networks take the place of weak institutions and propel 
market-oriented policy.  The substantive impact of these informal institutions is enhanced when 
embedded within a formal institutional arrangement that promotes the executive-party’s control 
of the legislature, limits the degree of federalism, and shields left-labor power from blocking 
reform initiatives.  Moreover, in the context of a healthy and stable economy (specifically low 
inflation and high per capita GDP) policy networks are able to achieve extensive neoliberal 
reforms.  Thus, the results of my analysis suggest that there is no one approach to the analysis of 
the politics of economic reform.  Rather, the politics of liberalization best explained when all 
components—institutions, interests, economic conditions, international pressures, and policy 
networks—are taken into account. 
 Lastly, it should be noted that although the results validate the notion that policy 
networks working as informal institutions expedite and push forward reform, these findings do 
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not represent the economic and political consequences of these substitutive groups.  The trade-
off of efficient reform achieved by informal institutions is a lack of accountability and 
transparency.  As aforementioned, informal networks are unofficial and non-transparent in 
nature.  Often deals are brokered behind closed doors, and the transaction cost of doing business 
in this manner is at the expense of the quality of democracy.46  Manzetti (2003) contends that an 
exclusive emphasis on market reform in Latin America permitted governments to pursue 
liberalization in an unorthodox manner, often resorting to corrupt methods that violate 
democratic principles.  The author writes: “…the Washington consensus for the most part 
neglected the importance of strengthening institutions of accountability.  In short, only one side 
of the equation (the economic one) was given its due—despite abundant theoretical evidence 
suggesting that when a country adopts the formal rules (in our case promarket reforms) of 
another, the results may turn out quite differently because the recipient county may have very 
different formal and informal institutions” (Manzetti 2003: 317).  In sum, the informal 
institutions of policy networks that serve as surrogates for weak formal structures are successful 
in achieving substantial economic reform.  However, this is often attained via unofficial and 






                                                 
46 In Argentina neoliberal reform was undertaken in this manner.  Manzetti (2003: 346) writes, “Most sectors 
continued to be regulated by secretariats directly dependent upon the Ministry of the Economy and Public Works, 




 The wave of neoliberal reform that swept Latin America in the 1980s was a product of an 
emerging economic consensus that stipulated governments pursue reform measures to stabilize 
the economy and open the market.  While there was agreement on the economics of 
neoliberalism, there was not—and is not—consensus regarding the politics of reform.  The 
literature analyzing the political aspects of liberalization is divided, both in perspective and 
method.  In order to move in the direction of a more cohesive examination of the politics of 
reform, my study has integrated the primary variables of the main approaches to the study of 
neoliberalism in a quantitative analysis.  Moreover, I have provided a theoretical framework that 
unites the body of work on the politics of market-oriented reforms.   
My analysis established that policy networks, working as informal institutions, drive the 
reform process.  Their effectiveness has been shown to be enhanced by formal structures, chiefly 
a legislature controlled by the president’s party.  Also, my study demonstrated federalism and 
left-labor power hinder the progress of reform.  Furthermore, the results confirmed that favorable 
economic conditions, specifically low inflation and high GDP per capita, are needed for 
successful market opening.  Most importantly, my research supported that there is not a single 
perspective appropriate for the study of the politics of reform.  Rather, integration of all elements 
of the political environment, including institutions, interests, economic conditions, international 
pressures, and policy networks, is necessary for a comprehensive study.   
My study provides a more conclusive explanation of the politics of reform, but there 
remains much work to do in the analysis of political variables and neoliberalism.  Future research 
should further explore the relationship between federalism and left-labor power, the 
consequences of external debt, and the interaction between formal and informal institutions.  
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First, the data and results suggest there is an association between federalism and left-labor 
power.  This may be the result of the multiple veto players federalist structures create; left-labor 
power may operate as a veto player within a federal state.  More research is required to fully 
understand this link and its effect on reform.  Second, the negative correlation of external debt 
and reform should be examined in depth.  The political and economic factors contributing to this 
relationship should be addressed in future studies.  Finally, additional research is needed to 
clarify the interchange of formal and informal institutions within the context of economic reform.  
The political mechanisms that mitigate the substitution of informal institutions for formal 
structures should be examined closely.  More research is needed to fully understand the politics 
of economic reform in Latin America, and my study offers a sound base for future analyses.   
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Summary Statistics of Variables 






General Reform 0.656 0.149 0.343 0.891 
Privatization 0.741 0.198 0 1 
Policy Networks -11.608 14.771 -58.129 0 
Regime 6.723 3.478 -3 10 
Party Fragmentation 3.214 1.467 1 8.67 
Federalism 2.548 1.709 0 6 
Total Veto Players 7.668 6.624 0 34.68 
Polarization 0.814 0.950 0 2 
Executive-Controlled Legislature  0.401 0.492 0 1 
Executive Strength 14.994 3.101 9 21 
Executive Ideology 2.172 0.909 1 3 
Reverse Honeymoon 3.113 2.002 1 12 
Left-Labor Power 30.075 19.659 3 69.8 
Exports/GDP  t-1 20.686 8.383 6.598 45.084 
External Aid  t-1 1.80e+08 1.39e+08 -2.54e+08 6.71e+08 
GDP per capita (log)  t-1 7.798 0.554 6.682 8.971 
GDP growth t-1 2.944 4.359 -11.800 12.822 
Inflation (log) t-1 3.792 1.497 1.429 9.372 
External Debt  t-1 2.96e+10 3.87e+10 1.61e+09 1.52e+11 
Current Account Balance  t-1 -3.218 4.239 -15.592 17.038 
Time 9.475 4.168 1 16 
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES  
 
Policy networks: finance minister turnover multiplied by exports as a share of GDP.  Finance 
minister turnover is calculated as the number of times a finance minister is instituted in office per 
year.  For example, if a country year experiences the appointment of four individuals, the 
observation is coded as 4; three ministers take office, that is coded 3; two finance ministers 
instituted into office, coded as 2; one finance minister takes office, coded as 1; the incumbent 
finance minister retains office, coded as 0.  Source: Keesing’s Record of World Events, 
corroborated with additional country sources and studies; World Development Indicators (2004). 
 
Regime: The Polity IV dataset reports two scores for regime, one reflects the degree of 
authoritarianism of a regime (AUTOC) and the other indicates the degree of democracy 
(DEMOC).  Both range from 0 to 10, with 10 corresponding to the most authoritarian or 
democratic.  In order to create a composite measure, the autocracy score is subtracted from the 
democracy score.  The resultant scale ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 being the least democratic 
and 10 the most democratic.  Source: Jaggers and Gurr 1995.   
 
Federalism: composite of 5 Database of Political Institutions indicators to create a scale ranging 
from 0 (least amount of federalism) to 7 (most amount of federalism).  The indicators used are: 
1. “auton”—Are there contiguous autonomous regions? (0,1) 
2. “muni”—Are municipal governments locally elected? (0 if neither local executive nor local 
legislatureare locally elected; 1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature elected; 2 if 
both are locally elected) 
3. “state”—Are there state/province governments locally elected? (0 if neither local executive 
nor local legislatureare locally elected; 1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature 
elected; 2 if both are locally elected) 
4. “author”—Do the state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or legislating? (if 1 
for any of these, category gets 1; 0 otherwise) 
5. “stconst”—Are the constituencies of the senators the states/provinces? (1 if elected on 
state/province level; 0 if elected on national basis) 
Source: The Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001).  
 
Party fragmentation: Laasko and Taagepera’s (1979) effective number of parties in lower 
house or unicameral legislature.  Source: Roberts and Wibbels (1999). 
 
Total veto players: interaction between federalism and party system fragmentation.  Source: 
same as cited above for federalism and fragmentation. 
 
Polarization: ideological variation among legislators.  The orientation of the president and 
legislators is recorded (left = -1, center = 0, and right = 1), then the absolute value of the greatest 
difference between the president and his party and the largest opposition party is taken.  Source: 
The Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001). 
 
Executive-controlled legislature: executive’s party controls all houses in the legislature.  
Source: The Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001). 
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Executive strength: legislative powers and nonlegislative powers of the president.  Legislative 
powers include: package veto/override, partial veto/override, decree, exclusive introduction of 
legislation (reserved policy areas), budgetary powers, and proposal of referenda.  Nonlegislative 
powers include: cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal, censure, and dissolution of assembly.  Each 
power is scored 0-4, with 4 being the greatest power and 0 the least.  The composite creates a 
scale of executive strength ranging from 0 to 40.  Source: Shugart and Carey (1992).  
 
Executive ideology: ideological orientation of the president.  Ideological scale used: 1 = left; 2 = 
center; and 3 = right.  Executive ideology is assigned independently of executive party 
orientation.  Source: The Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001). 
 
Reverse honeymoon: years since last election.  Source: The Database of Political Institutions 
(Beck, et al. 2001). 
 
Left-labor power: the level of unionization, weighted for militancy of left-labor parties.  Source: 
Roberts and Wibbels (1999).  
 
Business interests: exports as a share of GDP.  Source: World Development Indicators (2004).  
 
External aid: net official development assistance consisting of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee, by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote 
economic development and welfare in countries and territories.  Data are lagged one year.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2004).  
 
Per capita gross domestic product: GDP divided by midyear population.  GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products.  Data are in constant U.S. dollars.  Data are 
logged and lagged one year.  Source: World Development Indicators (2004). 
 
GDP growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency.  Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars.  GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products.  Data are lagged one year. Source: World Development 
Indicators (2004). 
 
Inflation: the consumer price index.  This reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed 
at specified intervals, such as yearly.  Data are logged and lagged one year.  Source: World 
Development Indicators (2004). 
 
External debt: the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term 
debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt.  Short-term debt includes all debt having an original 
maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars and lagged one year.  Source: World Development Indicators (2004). 
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Current account balance: the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current 
transfers.  Data are in current U.S. dollars.  Source: World Development Indicators (2004). 
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APPENDIX C  
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
To ensure the data are robust, the primary variable of interest—policy networks—is recalculated 
using a dummy variable for finance minister turnover.  This dummy variable codes observations 
with any turnover as 1; otherwise, the country year is coded 0.  Therefore, the robust policy 
networks variable is the product of the finance minister turnover dummy * exports/GDP t-1.   The 
resultant variable is decreased in its magnitude, with a minimum value of -43.268 and a 
maximum value of 0.  Therefore, these regression results demonstrate that the coefficients 
generated are not a product of the policy networks variable construction. 
 
Robust Regressions: Factors Affecting Economic Reform in Latin America, 1980-1995  
 General Reform Privatization 
Policy Networks   0.001       
(2.81)**
  0.001 
(2.67)** 




Federalism  -0.030 
(2.27)*
 -0.008 
(0.46)   
Party Fragmentation   0.004 
(0.51)
  0.001 
(0.14) 




Polarization   0.005 
(0.73)
  0.008 
(1.11) 
Executive-Controlled Legislature  -0.002 
(0.15)  
  0.056 
(3.65)** 








Reverse Honeymoon  -0.002 
(0.88)
  0.003 
(1.20) 




Exports/GDP t-1   0.001 
(0.90)
  0.002 
(1.36) 




GDP per Capita (log) t-1   -0.066 
(0.78)  
  0.240 
(2.44)** 
















Year   0.026 
(11.26)**
  0.002 
(0.81) 




R-Squared  .82  .88 
Z scores in parentheses; **Z-scores significant at the .01 level; *Z-scores significant at the .05 level 
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APPENDIX D  
AVERAGE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, 1980-1995 
 
 
Average Annual General Reform and Privatization Scores in Latin America, 1980-1995 
  














1985 0.549 0.692  
1986 0.572 0.714  
1987 0.601 0.730  
1988 0.615 0.743  
1989 0.648 0.726  
1990 0.685 0.713  
1991 0.736 0.736  
1992 0.783 0.750  
1993 0.800 0.765  
1994 0.809 0.781  
1995 0.824 0.800  
Source: Morley, et al. (1999)  
Average General Reform and Privatization Scores in Latin America by Country, 1980-1995 
  












Costa Rica 0.676 0.727
Highest: 
0.965, Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic 0.523 0.965  
Ecuador 0.617 0.664  
El Salvador 0.637 0.924  
Guatemala 0.667 0.917  
Mexico 0.679 0.644  
Peru 0.573 0.776  
Uruguay 0.826 0.887  
Venezuela 0.499 0.254  
Source: Morley, et al. (1999)  
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APPENDIX E  
COMPARISON OF LEFT-LABOR POWER AND FEDERLISM SCORES 
 
Average Federalism and Left-Labor Power Scores by Country, 1980-1995 
Federalism  Left-Labor Power 
Ecuador  0.00  Guatemala 3.59
El Salvador 0.00  El Salvador 9.42
Guatemala 0.00  Colombia 12.33
Chile 0.56  Chile 13.96
Peru 1.25  Dominican Republic 14.39
Uruguay 1.38  Costa Rica 16.61
Bolivia 1.88  Ecuador  19.43
Costa Rica 2.00  Brazil 26.54
Argentina 3.00  Uruguay 33.24
Dominican Republic 3.00  Bolivia 34.36
Brazil 3.94  Peru 42.28
Mexico 4.00  Argentina 50.37
Colombia 4.44  Venezuela 56.32
Venezuela 4.75  Mexico 61.31
Sources: The Database of Political Institutions (2004) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) 
         
 
Comparison of Federalism and 























































       Note: The left-labor power scores were divided by 10 to produce the above comparison. 
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APPENDIX F 
AVERAGE EXTERNAL DEBT BY COUNTRY 
 
External Debt by Country (in billions of current US dollars) 
 1980 Debt 1995 Debt Average  
Annual Debt  
1980-1995 
Argentina 20.9 75.1 52.7
Bolivia 2.5 4.9 4.2
Brazil 61.3 152.4 108.8
Chile 9.4 22.2 18.2
Colombia 5.9 21.9 14.3
Costa Rica 2.1 3.9 3.9
Dominican Rep 1.6 4.3 3.5
Ecuador  4.5 15.1 9.9
El Salvador 0.9 2.2 1.8
Guatemala 1.1 3.4 2.4
Honduras 1.2 4.7 2.9
Mexico 42.8 138.5 97.0
Peru 9.3 26.5 15.9
Uruguay 1.3 5.1 3.6
Venezuela 24.1 36.9 33.9
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